Set-Theoretic Geology by Fuchs, Gunter et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
10
7.
47
76
v2
  [
ma
th.
LO
]  
18
 N
ov
 20
14
November 20, 2014
SET-THEORETIC GEOLOGY
GUNTER FUCHS, JOEL DAVID HAMKINS, AND JONAS REITZ
Abstract. A ground of the universe V is a transitive proper class W ⊆ V ,
such that W |= ZFC and V is obtained by set forcing over W , so that V =
W [G] for some W -generic filter G ⊆ P ∈ W . The model V satisfies the ground
axiom GA if there are no such W properly contained in V . The model W is
a bedrock of V if W is a ground of V and satisfies the ground axiom. The
mantle of V is the intersection of all grounds of V . The generic mantle of
V is the intersection of all grounds of all set-forcing extensions of V . The
generic HOD, written gHOD, is the intersection of all HODs of all set-forcing
extensions. The generic HOD is always a model of ZFC, and the generic mantle
is always a model of ZF. Every model of ZFC is the mantle and generic mantle
of another model of ZFC. We prove this theorem while also controlling the
HOD of the final model, as well as the generic HOD. Iteratively taking the
mantle penetrates down through the inner mantles to what we call the outer
core, what remains when all outer layers of forcing have been stripped away.
Many fundamental questions remain open.
The technique of forcing in set theory is customarily thought of as a method
for constructing outer as opposed to inner models of set theory. A set theorist
typically has a model of set theory V and constructs a larger model V [G], the
forcing extension, by adjoining a V -generic filter G over some partial order P ∈ V .
A switch in perspective, however, allows us to view forcing as a method of describing
inner models as well. The idea is simply to search inwardly for how the model V
might itself have arisen by forcing. Given a set-theoretic universe V , we consider
the classes W over which V can be realized as a forcing extension V = W [G] by
some W -generic filter G ⊆ P ∈ W . This change in viewpoint is the basis for a
collection of questions leading to the topic we refer to as set-theoretic geology. In
this article, we present some of the most interesting initial results in the topic, along
with an abundance of open questions, many of which concern fundamental issues.
1. The mantle
We assume that the reader is familiar with the technique of forcing in set theory.
Working in ZFC set theory and sometimes in GBC set theory, we suppose V is
the universe of all sets. A class W is a ground of V , if W is a transitive class
model of ZFC and V is obtained by set forcing over W , that is, if there is some
forcing notion P ∈ W and a W -generic filter G ⊆ P such that V = W [G]. Laver
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[Lav07] and independently Woodin [Woo04b] [Woo04a] proved in this case that W
is a definable class in V , using parameters in W , a result that was generalized by
Hamkins to include many natural instances of class forcing (see theorems 5 and 6).
Building on these ideas, Hamkins and Reitz [Ham05, Rei06, Rei07] introduced the
following axiom.
Definition 1. The ground axiom GA is the assertion that the universe V is not
obtained by set forcing over any strictly smaller ground model.
Because of the quantification over classes, the ground axiom assertion appears
at first to be fundamentally second order in nature, but Reitz [Rei07, Rei06] proved
that it is actually first-order expressible (an equivalent claim is implicit, indepen-
dently, in [Woo04a]).
Definition 2. A class W is a bedrock for V if it is a ground of V and minimal with
respect to the forcing-extension relation.
Since a ground of a ground is a ground, we may equivalently define that W is
a bedrock of V if it is a ground of V and satisfies the ground axiom. Also, since
by fact 11 any inner model U of ZFC with W ⊆ U ⊆ V for some ground W of V
is both a forcing extension of W and a ground of V , we may equivalently define
that W is a bedrock for V if it is a ground of V that is minimal with respect to
inclusion among all grounds of V . It remains an open question whether there can
be a model V having more than one bedrock model.
In this article, we attempt to carry the investigation deeper underground, bring-
ing to light the structure of the grounds of the set-theoretic universe V and how
they relate to the grounds of the forcing extensions of V . Continuing the geological
metaphor, the principal new concept is:
Definition 3. The mantle M of a model of set theory is the intersection of all of
its grounds.
The ground axiom can be reformulated as the assertion V = M, that is, as the
assertion that V is its own mantle. The mantle was briefly mentioned, unnamed,
at the conclusion of [Rei07], where the question was raised whether it necessarily
models ZFC. Our main theorem in this article is a converse of sorts:
Main Theorem 4. Every model of ZFC is the mantle of another model of ZFC.
This theorem is a consequence of the more specific claims of theorems 66 and 67,
in which we are able not only to control the mantle of the target model, but also
what we call the generic mantle, as well as the HOD and generic HOD. We begin
by proving that the mantle, although initially defined with second-order reference
to the meta-class of all ground models, actually admits a first-order definition. This
is a consequence of the following fact, formulated in second-order set theory.
Theorem 5 (The ground-model definability theorem). Every ground model W of
V is definable in V using a parameter from W . That is, there is a specific formula
φ(y, x) such that if V = W [G] is a forcing extension of a ground W by W -generic
filter G ⊆ P ∈W , then there is r ∈W such that
W = {x | φ(r, x)}.
The ground-model definability theorem was proved independently by Laver and
Woodin, and proved by Hamkins in the strengthened form of theorem 6, below,
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which extends the result beyond set-forcing to include also many natural instances
of class forcing and non-forcing extensions. The history is that after Laver proved
the ground-model definability theorem, he had noticed a similarity in his original
proof (never published) with the main argument of Hamkins andWoodin in [HW00],
and had contacted Hamkins about it, who provided a proof based on the approxi-
mation and cover properties, establishing theorem 6, and it is this proof that Laver
adopted in [Lav07].
Theorem 6. Every pseudo-ground model W of V is definable in V using a pa-
rameter from W . That is, if an inner model W ⊆ V of ZFC satisfies the δ-
approximation and cover properties for some regular cardinal δ of W for which also
(δ+)W = (δ+)V , then W is definable in V using parameter r = (<δ2)W .
A pseudo ground is simply an inner model W ⊆ V having the properties stated
in the second part of the theorem, and by lemma 8 this case includes every set-
forcing extension, as well as the extensions arising with many instances of class
forcing, such as the canonical forcing of the GCH, the global Laver preparation and
other progressively closed Easton-support iterations. In light of this, we should like
briefly to mention and then leave for the future the idea of undertaking the entire
set-theoretic geology project of this article in the more general context of pseudo-
grounds, rather than only the set-forcing grounds, for this context would include
these other natural extensions that are not a part of the current investigation.
Because the basic definability theorems apply in this more general case, however,
one may formalize the pseudo-ground analogues of the ground axiom, bedrocks, the
mantle and the generic mantle.
Definition 7 ([Ham03]). Suppose that W ⊆ V are both transitive models of (a
suitable small fragment of) ZFC and δ is a cardinal in V .
(1) The extension W ⊆ V exhibits the δ-approximation property if whenever
A ∈ V with A ⊆ W and A ∩ B ∈ W for all B ∈ W with |B|W < δ, then
A ∈W .
(2) The extension W ⊆ V exhibits the δ-cover property if for every A ∈ V with
A ⊆W and |A|V < δ, there is B ∈W such that A ⊆ B and |B|W < δ.
Such extensions are pervasive in set theory, in light of the following key lemma.
Lemma 8 ([Ham03, lemma 13]). If V ⊂ V [G] is a forcing extension by forcing of
the form Q1∗Q˙2, where Q1 is nontrivial and Q1“ Q˙2 is ≤|Q1| strategically closed”,
then V ⊆ V [G] satisfies the δ-approximation and δ-cover properties for δ = |Q1|
+.
In particular, since the second factor Q2 can be trivial, it follows that every
forcing extension V ⊆ V [G], with V -generic filter G ⊆ Q ∈ V , exhibits the δ-
approximation and δ-covering property for δ = |Q|+, and this is why theorem 6
generalizes theorem 5. Lemma 8 has an improved proof in [HJ10, lemma 12],
following Mitchell’s treatment [Mit06], which really goes all the way back to [Mit73],
and see also the generalization in [Ung, §1].
The parameter in Laver’s original proof of the ground-model definability theorem
was a large initial segment r = VWθ of the ground model universe, well above the size
of the forcing. This was reduced to parameter r = P (δ)W in [Lav07] by the Hamkins
argument, where the forcing P has the δ-approximation and cover property, and for
this any cardinal δ ≥ |P|+ suffices by lemma 8. Hamkins and Johnstone subse-
quently noted that P (δ)W is actually determined via the δ-approximation property
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by r = (<δ2)W , and so this smaller parameter suffices, as we have stated in the
results here. If δ = γ+, then this parameter is equidefinable from P (γ)W , and so
in the case of a set forcing extension V = W [G] with G ⊆ P ∈ W , we may define
W in V with parameter r = P (P)W , which seems extremely natural. Nevertheless,
for many instances of set forcing, theorem 6 shows that a much smaller parameter
than P (P)W suffices, since by lemma 8 there are many natural forcing notions P
that exhibit the δ-approximation and cover properties even when |P| is far larger
than δ. For example, if one adds a Cohen real and then performs any countably
strategically closed forcing, the original ground model W will be definable in the
final extension from parameter P (ω)W , even when the forcing is enormous.
The proof of theorem 6 is based fundamentally on the following lemma, of which
we shall make use subsequently. It is convenient to express the lemma using the
theory ZFCδ, isolated by Reitz in [Rei06, Rei07], which has the axioms of Zermelo
set theory, the foundation axiom, the axiom of choice, the ≤δ-replacement axioms
(asserting all instances of replacement for functions with domain δ, a fixed regular
cardinal), together with the assertion that every set is coded by a set of ordinals.
This theory is formalized in the language with a constant symbol for δ, and it is
an easy exercise to see that Vθ |= ZFCδ for any i-fixed point θ = iθ of cofinality
larger than δ, a regular cardinal.
Lemma 9 (Hamkins, see [Rei07, lemma 7.2]). Suppose that W , W ′ and U are
transitive models of ZFCδ, where δ is a fixed regular cardinal, that W ⊆ U and
W ′ ⊆ U have the δ-approximation and δ-cover properties, that (<δ2)W = (<δ2)W
′
and that (δ+)W = (δ+)W
′
= (δ+)U . Then W =W ′.
In the context of theorem 6, the precise definition of the ground model W in its
forcing extension V = W [G], using parameter r = (<δ2)W , is that x ∈ W just in
case, in V , there is a cardinal θ = iθ of cofinality larger than δ and a subsetM ⊆ Vθ
exhibiting the δ-approximation and δ-cover properties, with x ∈ M |= ZFCδ and
r = (<δ2)M and (δ+)M = δ+. Lemma 9 shows that any such M will have to be
VWθ , since V
W
θ does have these properties. The results of [BHTU] rely in part on
an analysis of the precise logical complexity of this definition.
For the subsequent theorems, we will make use of the following folklore facts.
An inner model is a transitive class containing all the ordinals and satisfying ZF.
We shall also frequently speak of inner models of ZFC as well.
Fact 10. If W = { 〈r, x〉 | φ(r, x) } is a definable class, then the class of all r for
which the section Wr = { x | 〈r, x〉 ∈W } is an inner model of ZFC is definable.
Proof. This amounts to a standard result in Jech [Jec03, Theorem 13.9], asserting
that the question of whether a transitive proper class containing all the ordinals
satisfies full ZFC is expressible by a single first-order formula. What needs to be
said is that Wr is transitive, contains all the ordinals, is closed under the Go¨del
operations, is almost universal, meaning that every A ⊆ Wr is covered by some
B ∈Wr, and satisfies the axiom of choice. 
Fact 11 ([Jec03, Corollary 15.43]). Suppose that V ⊆ V [G] is the forcing extension
arising from a V -generic filter G ⊆ P ∈ V . If U is a transitive model of ZFC with
V ⊆ U ⊆ V [G], then U is a forcing extension of V and a ground of V [G]. In fact,
U is a forcing extension of V by a filter G0 on a complete subalgebra B0 of the
complete Boolean algebra B = RO(P).
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Proof. We first show a general fact about forcing extensions: If A ⊆ κ is a set of
ordinals in V [G], then there is a complete subalgebra C ⊂ B such that V [A] =
V [C ∩ G]. To see this, fix a name A˙ for A and consider the set XA of boolean
values [[α ∈ A˙ ]] for α < κ determining membership in A. Taking C ⊂ B to be
the complete subalgebra generated by XA in V , it is straightforward to verify that
V [A] = V [C∩G] (here we use the fact that C∩G is determined by XA ∩G, which
follows from the fact that XA generates C).
Now consider our models V ⊂ U ⊂ V [G]. Let A ⊂ κ be a set of ordinals in U
coding P (B)U . Let B0 be the complete subalgebra obtained by applying the general
fact given above to the set A, and let G0 = B0 ∩ G be the corresponding generic
filter. It remains to argue that V [G0] = U . For the forward inclusion, note that
A ∈ U and so V [G0] = V [A] is contained in U . For the reverse inclusion, it suffices
to show that every set of ordinals in U is in V [G0]. But this also follows from the
general fact above: each such set of ordinals B is determined (over V ) by CB ∩G
for an appropriate subalgebra CB . However, CB ∩ G is in P (B)
U , and therefore
appears in A. It follows that B ∈ V [A], and so V [G0] = U . The remaining claim,
that U is a ground of V , relies on a general fact about complete embeddings of
partial orders: If B0 ⊂ B is a complete subalgebra, then B is forcing equivalent to
the iteration B0∗B/G˙0, where the second factor is (a name for) the quotient of B by
the generic filter G˙0 on B0. The details of this relationship are explored in [Kun80,
pp243–244, Ex. D3–D4]. 
The following theorem summarizes several senses in which we have first-order
definable access to the family of ground models of the universe.
Theorem 12. There is a parameterized family {Wr | r ∈ V } of classes such that
(1) Every Wr is a ground of V , and r ∈Wr.
(2) Every ground of V is Wr for some r.
(3) The classes Wr are uniformly definable in the sense that { 〈r, x〉 | x ∈ Wr }
is first order definable without parameters.
(4) The relation “V =Wr[G], where G ⊆ P ∈ Wr is Wr-generic” is first-order
expressible in V in the arguments (r,G,P).
(5) The definition relativizes down from V in the sense that if Wr ⊆ U ⊆ V
for an inner model U |= ZFC, then WUr =Wr.
(6) The definition relativizes up from V in the sense that for any r and any
forcing extension V [G], there is s with Wr =Ws =W
V [G]
s .
Proof. By theorem 5, there is a formula φ(r, x) such that every ground W of V
has the form Wr = { x | φ(r, x) } for some r ∈ W . Furthermore, by fact 10, the
question of whether for a given r the class Ur = { x | φ(r, x) } defines a transitive
inner model of ZFC is first-order expressible. Thus, by quantifying over the possible
partial orders P in this class and the possible Ur-generic filtersG ⊆ P, we can express
in a first-order manner whether Ur is in fact a ground of V or not. Thus, we define
Wr = { x | φ(r, x) }, if this is a ground of V , and otherwise Wr = V . It follows
that Wr is defined for all r, that r ∈ Wr, that the ground models of V are exactly
the classes Wr and that the relation “x ∈ Wr” is first-order definable. So (1), (2)
and (3) hold. Using this, we conclude that the relation of (4) is also first-order
definable, since we merely express that P is a partial order in Wr , that G is a filter
meeting every dense subset of P in Wr and that every set is the interpretation of
a P-name in Wr by G. For (5), suppose that Wr ⊆ U ⊆ V and U |= ZFC. Since
6 GUNTER FUCHS, JOEL DAVID HAMKINS, AND JONAS REITZ
Wr is a ground of V , we may exhibit it as V =Wr [G], where G ⊆ P is Wr-generic.
Furthermore, by the details of the definition φ provided by theorem 6 and fact 10,
we may assume that r = (<δ2)Wr , where δ > |ro(P)|. Since Wr ⊆ U ⊆Wr[G] = V ,
it follows by fact 11 that U = Wr[G0] is a forcing extension of Wr by a complete
subalgebra of ro(P). Since that complete subalgebra also has size less than δ, we
may use the same parameter r = (<δ2)Wr to defineWr inside U . Thus,W
V
r =W
U
r ,
as desired for (5). For (6), because Wr is a ground of V , it is also a ground of V [G],
and so Wr = W
V [G]
s for some s. By (5), since V is intermediate between W
V [G]
s
and V [G], we have WVs =W
V [G]
s , establishing (6). 
One may also prove a pseudo-ground analogue of theorem 12 with essentially the
same arguments (see [BHTU]). We shall now fix the notation Wr of theorem 12
for the rest of this article, so that Wr now refers to the ground of V defined by
parameter r, and this definition is completely uniform, so that the classesWUr index
the grounds of U for any model U of ZFC, as r ranges over U .
Theorem 12 shows that we are essentially able to treat the meta-class collection
of all ground models of V in an entirely first-order manner. Quantifying over the
ground models becomes simply quantifying over the parameters r used to define
them as Wr, and the basic questions about the existence and relations among vari-
ous ground models become first-order properties of these parameters. For example,
the ground axiom asserts ∀r V = Wr, and a ground model Wr is a bedrock model
if ∀s (Ws ⊆ Wr → Ws = Wr). Alternatively, one could also have defined that Wr
is a bedrock if (GA)Wr , that is, if the ground axiom holds when relativized to Wr.
Corollary 13. The mantle of any model of set theory is a parameter-free uniformly
first-order-definable transitive class in that model, containing all ordinals.
Proof. We’ve already done the work above. If M is the mantle of V , then
M =
⋂
r
Wr,
or in other words, x ∈M↔ ∀r x ∈ Wr, which is a uniform parameter-free definition.
And being the intersection of grounds, the mantle is clearly transitive and contains
all ordinals. 
Definition 14. The ground models of the universe V are downward directed under
inclusion if the intersection of any two contains a third, that is, if for every r and s,
there is t with Wt ⊆Wr ∩Ws. The ground models are locally downward directed if
for every r and s and every set B, there is t with Wt∩B ⊆Wr ∩Ws. And similarly
there are the upward-directed notions.
Numerous fundamental open questions arise once one is situated in the context
of the collection of all ground models.
Question 15 ([Rei06, Rei07]). Is there a unique bedrock model when one exists?
Reitz [Rei06, Rei07] shows that there can be models of ZFC having no bedrock
models at all. A more general question is:
Question 16 ([Rei06]). Are the ground models of the universe downward directed?
If the ground models are downward directed, then of course there cannot be
distinct bedrock models, since the bedrock models are exactly the minimal ground
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models with respect to inclusion. So an affirmative answer to question 16 implies
an affirmative answer to question 15. Allowing larger intersections, let us say that
the ground models of the universe are downward set-directed under inclusion if
the intersection of any set-indexed collection of ground models contains a ground
model, that is, if for every set A there is t such that Wt ⊆
⋂
r∈AWr. Relaxing this
somewhat, we say that the ground models are locally downward set-directed if for
any sets A and B there is t such that Wt ∩B ⊆
⋂
r∈AWr.
Question 17. Are the ground models of the universe downward set-directed? Are
they locally downward set-directed? Are they locally downward directed?
Affirmative answers to all of the questions we have asked so far are consistent with
ZFC. The answers are trivially affirmative under the ground axiom, for example,
since in this case the only ground model is the universe itself. More generally, the
questions all have affirmative answers if there is a least member of the collection
of grounds under inclusion, or equivalently, in other words, if the mantle itself is a
ground. This last hypothesis is true in any set-forcing extension of L.
Definition 18. An inner model W is a solid bedrock for V if it is a ground of V
and contained in all other grounds of V . The solid bedrock axiom is the assertion
that there is a solid bedrock.
The bedrock axiom of [Rei07], in contrast, asserts merely that there is a bedrock,
but not necessarily that this bedrock is solid. In other words, the bedrock axiom
asserts that there is a minimal ground, while the solid bedrock axiom asserts that
there is a smallest ground.
Definition 19. The downward-directed grounds hypothesis DDG is the assertion
that the ground models of the universe are downward directed. The strong DDG
is the assertion that the ground models of the universe are downward set-directed.
The generic DDG is the assertion that the DDG holds in all forcing extensions.
The generic strong DDG is the assertion that the strong DDG holds in all forcing
extensions.
IfW is a solid bedrock, it follows of course thatW is precisely the mantle. Thus,
the solid bedrock axiom is equivalent to the assertion that the mantle is a ground,
and it immediately implies the strong DDG and all of the directedness properties
that we have considered. Reitz observed in [Rei06] that under the continuum coding
axiom CCA, the assertion that every set is coded into the GCH pattern, it follows
that the universe is contained in every ground of every forcing extension. Thus,
CCA implies that the universe is a solid bedrock in all its forcing extensions, and
so the strong DDG holds in V and all forcing extensions. That is, the CCA implies
the generic strong DDG hypothesis. An affirmative answer to (the first part of)
question 17 implies an affirmative answer to question 16, which we have said implies
an affirmative answer to question 15.
Let us now prove that we can obtain affirmative answers to all of the above
questions in the case where the universe is constructible from a set. Define that a
generic ground of V is a ground of a forcing extension of V .
Theorem 20. If V = L[a] for a set a, then the generic strong DDG holds. Indeed,
all the models of the form
Hα = HODV
Coll(ω,α)
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are grounds of V and they are downward set-directed and dense in the grounds and
indeed in the generic grounds, in the sense that every ground W of V or of any
forcing extension V [G] has Hα ⊆ W for all sufficiently large α. These grounds
therefore exhibit the desired downward set-directedness.
Proof. For any ordinal α, we let Hα denote the class HODV
Coll(ω,α)
consisting of all
x forced by 1 to be in the HOD of the extension via Coll(ω, α). The second part
of the theorem can be formalized as the statement that for any poset P and any
P-name r˙ we have that P forces Hˇα ⊆W
V [G˙]
r˙ for all sufficiently large α.
To begin the proof, note that if G is Coll(ω, α)-generic over V for some ordinal α,
then since the forcing is weakly homogeneous and ordinal-definable, it follows that
HODV [G] ⊆ HODV and moreover x ∈ HODV [G] if and only if 1  xˇ ∈ HOD, which
implies that HODV [G] does not depend on G and is equal to Hα. In particular, Hα
is an inner model of V that satisfies ZFC. Similar homogeneity reasoning shows that
Hβ ⊆ Hα whenever α < β, and so the collection of Hα is downward set-directed.
If W is a ground of V , so that V = W [g] for some W -generic g ⊆ P ∈ W , then
let θ be any cardinal at least as large as card(P) and suppose that G is V -generic
for Coll(ω, θ). We may absorb the P forcing into the collapse, since P× Coll(ω, θ)
is forcing equivalent to Coll(ω, θ) by [Jec03, Lemma 26.7], and so
V [G] =W [g][G] =W [G′]
for some W -generic filter G′ ⊆ Coll(ω, θ). Furthermore, we may observe that
HODV [G] = HODW [G
′] ⊆W,
where the inclusion holds because Coll(ω, θ) is weakly homogeneous and ordinal
definable in W . Finally, using our hypothesis that V = L[a], we argue that
HODV [G] is a ground of V . This is a consequence of Vopeˇnka’s theorem [Jec03,
Theorem 15.46], which asserts that every set is generic over HOD. In our case,
since V [G] = L[a,G], we have that a and G are generic over HODV [G], and so
HODV [G] ⊆ V ⊆ HODV [G][a,G] = V [G], trapping V between HODV [G] and its
forcing extension V [G]. It therefore follows by fact 11 that HODV [G] is a ground
of V , as desired. The downward set-directedness of the grounds is now an obvious
consequence.
Finally, to see that the models Hα are dense in the generic grounds, let W be
a ground of V [h], so that W [g] = V [h] for some W -generic filter g and V -generic
h ⊆ Q ∈ V . By applying what we have proved so far, but in V [h], we know that
HODV [h]
Coll(ω,α)
⊆W for sufficiently large α. But by insisting that α is also larger
than Q, the forcing Q is absorbed into the collapse via Q ∗Coll(ω, α) ≡ Coll(ω, α),
and from this it follows that HODV [h]
Coll(ω,α)
= HODV
Coll(ω,α)
= Hα, and so Hα ⊆
W as desired. Lastly, again it is easy to see as a consequence that the generic
grounds are downward set-directed, and so the generic DDG holds in V . 
To what extent generally can we expect the grounds to be directed, locally set
directed or even fully set-directed? A model of ZFC having two bedrock models,
providing a negative answer to question 15, would be very interesting. Aside from
the naturalness of these hypotheses, their merit is that if they hold, the mantle is
well behaved. Before examining their effect on the mantle, let’s step back a little
and look at a more general setup. We say that {Up | p ∈ I} is a parameterized
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family of inner models if each Up is an inner model and there is a formula ϕ such
that x ∈ Up if and only if ϕ(x, p) holds.
Lemma 21. If W = {Up | p ∈ I} is a parameterized family of inner models, then⋂
W is an inner model if and only if Vα ∩ (
⋂
W) ∈
⋂
W for every ordinal α.
Furthermore, this is indeed the case if
⋂
W is a definable class in every U ∈ W.
Proof. For the forward direction of the claimed equivalence, assume that
⋂
W is an
inner model, that is, a transitive class model of ZF containing all ordinals. Given
an ordinal α, it follows that (Vα)
⋂
W ∈
⋂
W . By absoluteness of rank, (Vα)
⋂
W =
Vα ∩ (
⋂
W), which proves the forward direction. For the reverse direction, note
that
⋂
W is transitive, contains all the ordinals, and is closed under the eight
Go¨del operations, since this is true of every member of W , as each member of W
is an inner model. So by fact 10, in order to prove that
⋂
W is an inner model,
all that’s left to show is that it is almost universal. So let A be a subset of
⋂
W
and let α be the rank of A. Then A ⊆ Vα ∩ (
⋂
W) ∈
⋂
W by assumption, showing
almost universality, and hence proving the equivalence.
Now assume that
⋂
W is a definable subclass of every U ∈ W . For any ordinal α
and any U ∈ W , we have Vα∩ (
⋂
W) = Vα∩U ∩ (
⋂
W) = V Uα ∩ (
⋂
W) ∈ U , by the
separation axiom in U . Since U was arbitrary, it follows that Vα ∩ (
⋂
W) ∈
⋂
W ,
as desired. 
Let’s now return to the mantle and explore the effects our concepts of directed-
ness have on it.
Theorem 22.
(1) If the DDG holds, that is, if the grounds are downward directed, then the
mantle is constant across these ground models.
(2) If the mantle is constant across the grounds, then it is a model of ZF.
(3) If the strong DDG holds, that is, if the grounds are downward set-directed,
then the mantle is a model of ZFC.
(4) Indeed, this latter conclusion can be made if the grounds are merely down-
ward directed and locally downward set-directed.
Proof. (1) Suppose that the ground models of V are downward directed. Fix a
groundW . Since any ground of W is also a ground of V , it follows that the mantle
of V is contained in the mantle of W . Conversely, if a is not in the mantle of V ,
then it is not in some ground W ′, and so it is not in W ∩W ′. By directedness,
however, there is a ground W¯ ⊆W ∩W ′. Clearly, W¯ is a ground of W , so that the
mantle of W is contained in W¯ . But a /∈ W¯ , so a is not in the mantle of W . So
the mantle is constant among the ground models of V .
(2) If the mantle is constant across the grounds, then in particular, it is a defin-
able subclass of every ground. Since the mantle is the intersection of all the grounds,
it is an inner model by lemma 21, which we proved precisely for this purpose.
For (3) and (4), suppose that the ground models are downward directed and
locally downward set-directed. By (1) and (2), the mantle satisfies ZF. For ZFC,
consider any set y in the mantle M. Every ground modelW , being a model of ZFC,
has various well orderings of y; what we must show is that there is a well ordering
of y in common to all the grounds. For each well ordering z of y that is not in
the mantle, there is a ground model Wrz with z /∈ Wrz . By local set-directedness,
the family {Wrz | z is a well order of y with z /∈ M } has a ground model W with
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W ∩ B ⊆ Wrz for all such relations z, where B is the set in V of all relations on
y. That is, any relation z excluded from the mantle is excluded by reason of not
being in a particular ground model Wrz , and consequently it is also excluded from
W . Any well ordering of y in W , therefore, is in the mantle, and since W |= ZFC,
there are many such well orderings. So M |= ZFC, as desired for (3) and (4). 
The argument of theorem 22 can be viewed as an instance of the following general
phenomenon.
Definition 23. A parameterized family W = {Ni | i ∈ I} of transitive sets or
classes, where I is a class, is locally downward set-directed, if for any set B and any
set J ⊆ I, there is an i0 ∈ I such that B ∩Ni0 ⊆ B ∩ (
⋂
i∈J Ni).
Clearly, it is equivalent to require merely that B ∩Ni0 ⊆
⋂
i∈J Ni.
Corollary 24.
(1) IfW is a locally downward set-directed parameterized family of inner models
of ZFC and Vα∩(
⋂
W) ∈
⋂
W for every ordinal α, then
⋂
W satisfies ZFC.
(2) If W = {Wα | α ∈ Ord } is any definable sequence of inner models that is
descending in the sense that α < β implies Wβ ⊆ Wα, then
⋂
W is an
inner model, and if every Wα satisfies ZFC, then so does
⋂
W.
Proof. The first claim follows by lemma 21 and the argument of theorem 22. For the
second claim, suppose thatW is a descending sequence of inner models. To see that⋂
W is an inner model, it suffices to show by lemma 21 that Vα∩ (
⋂
W) ∈
⋂
W for
every ordinal α. Fix any ordinal α. Since Vα is a set, we may simply wait for all the
elements of Vα that will eventually fall out of the V
Wβ
α to have fallen out—simply
apply the replacement axiom to the falling-out times—and thereby find an ordinal
β such that V
Wβ′
α = V
Wβ
α for all β′ ≥ β. Then V
Wβ
α = Vα∩Wβ = Vα∩(
⋂
W), so all
that needs to be shown is that V
Wβ
α ∈Wγ , for every γ. But this is clear for γ < β,
as V
Wβ
α ∈ Wβ ⊆Wγ in that case. And for γ ≥ β, we have that V
Wβ
α = V
Wγ
α ∈Wγ .
So
⋂
W is an inner model. To see that this model satisfies choice if every member
of W does, it suffices to observe that W is downward set-directed. 
Let us remark that having a descending sequence of set-sized length does not
suffice for the conclusion, even when the intersection of all of its members is defin-
able in each of the models. In [McA74], for example, a model of ZFC is produced
in which the sequence 〈HODn | n < ω〉 is definable, where HODn+1 = HODHOD
n
,
and where the intersection HODω =
⋂
n<ω HOD
n does not satisfy the axiom of
choice. Since the model produced there is constructible from a set, it follows from
[Gri75] that the sequence of iterated HODs is definable in every iterated HOD,
and so HODω is a class in every HODn there. So by lemma 21, we know that
HODω is an inner model in that case, but still not a model of ZFC. Note that by
corollary 24, if the sequence 〈HODα | α ∈ Ord〉 is definable, then the intersection
HODOrd =
⋂
α<OrdHOD
α is a model of ZFC, as every HODα+1 is a model of ZFC
and HODOrd =
⋂
α<OrdHOD
α+1. Another natural example is given by [Deh78],
where it is shown that if κ is a measurable cardinal and µ is a normal measure
on κ, then the intersection of, for example, the first ω2 many iterated ultrapowers
of V by µ fails to satisfy the axiom of choice. Clearly, though, this intersection is
definable in each of the earlier iterates, and so by lemma 21 it is an inner model.
There is also an interesting example, given by a 1974 result due to Harrington
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appearing in [Zad83, section 7], where a model is constructed in which the in-
tersection
⋂
n<ω HOD
n is not a model of ZF, and actually, neither the sequence
〈HODn | n < ω〉 nor
⋂
n<ω HOD
n is a class in that model.
It follows by fact 11 that if the mantle M is a ground of V , then there are only a
set number of possible intermediate models M ⊆W ⊆ V , since each is determined
by its filter on a certain subalgebra of the forcing from M to V . Thus, under the
solid bedrock axiom, there are only set many grounds, in the sense that there is
a set I such that every ground of V is Wr for some r ∈ I. We don’t know if the
converse holds.
Question 25. Is the solid bedrock axiom equivalent to the assertion that there are
only set many grounds?
A strong counterexample to this would be a model V having only set many
grounds, but no minimal ground. Any such model would of course also be a coun-
terexample to downward set-directedness and the generic strong DDG hypothesis.
Theorem 26. If the universe is constructible from a set, then question 25 has
a positive answer. Indeed, if the universe is constructible from a set, then the
following are equivalent:
(1) There are only set many grounds.
(2) The bedrock axiom.
(3) The solid bedrock axiom.
Proof. Suppose V is constructible from a set. For every ordinal α, let Hα =
HODV
Coll(ω,α)
, as in the proof of theorem 20.
(1→2) Assume that V has only set many grounds {Wr | r ∈ I }, for some set I.
By theorem 20, for each r ∈ I there is an ordinal αr for which H
αr ⊆Wr . Thus, if
α = supr αr, we have the ground H
α contained in all grounds Wr. In other words,
Hα is a smallest ground, verifying both the bedrock axiom, as well as the solid
bedrock axiom.
(2→3) Suppose that W is a minimal ground. By theorem 20, it follows that
W must have the form Hα for some α, and moreover that W = Hβ for all larger
β, since the Hγ sequence is non-increasing with respect to inclusion. Thus, W is
contained in every Hγ , and since these models are dense in the grounds, it follows
that W is contained in every ground. So W is a solid bedrock, as desired.
(3→1) This implication was proved in the remarks before the statement of ques-
tion 25. 
Theorem 27. Every model V of ZFC has a class forcing extension V [G] in which
the grounds are downward set-directed, but there is no bedrock.
Proof. This is the essence of [Rei06, Theorem 24], where Reitz showed that every
model has a class forcing extension having no bedrock. Beginning with any model
V , we first move to a class forcing extension V exhibiting the continuum coding
axiom (CCA), which asserts that every set of ordinals is coded into the GCH pattern
of the continuum function κ 7→ 2κ, by iteratively coding sets into this pattern.
Then, in V , let P be the Easton-support class product of forcing adding a Cohen
subset to every regular cardinal λ for which 2<λ = λ, and suppose that V [G]
is the corresponding class forcing extension. This forcing preserves all cardinals,
cofinalities and the GCH pattern over V . Consequently, the sets of V remain coded
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unboundedly often into the GCH pattern of V [G]. Suppose that W is a ground of
V [G]. Since W and V [G] have the same eventual GCH pattern, it follows that the
sets of V are also all coded into the GCH pattern of W , and so V ⊆ W . At each
coordinate λ at which we have performed forcing, we may consider the generic filter
added on that coordinate as a subset G(λ) ⊆ λ. In this way, we may view the (union
of) the entire filter G as a subset of the ordinal plane G =
∏
λG(λ) ⊆ Ord×Ord.
Let β be a regular cardinal larger than the size of the forcing from W to V [G], so
that W ⊆ V [G] satisfies the β-approximation property by lemma 8. Since G(β) is
a subset of β, with all initial segments in V and hence in W , it follows immediately
by the approximation property that G(β) ∈ W . A similar argument works with
many coordinates at once. Namely, if β < ξ, let Gβ,ξ be the part of the generic
filter added at coordinates between β and ξ, so that we may view Gβ,ξ ⊆ (β, ξ)× ξ.
The corresponding forcing Pβ,ξ is ≤β-closed in V . Suppose that A ⊆ (β, ξ) × Ord
is a piece of the domain with A ∈ W and of size less than β in W . Since A is also
in V [G], it follows by the closure of the forcing at coordinate β and beyond that
A ∈ V [Gβ ], the extension with forcing only at coordinates strictly before β. Since
that forcing has size at most β, it follows that A is covered by a set B ⊇ A with
B ∈ V and of size at most β in V . In this case, since the forcing Pβ,ξ is ≤β-closed in
V , it follows that Gβ,ξ∩B ∈ V and consequently alsoGβ,ξ∩B ∈ W . By intersecting
with A, we see that Gβ,ξ ∩ A ∈ W as well, and so we have established that every
δ-approximation to Gβ,ξ is in W . By the β-approximation property of W ⊆ V [G],
therefore, it follows that Gβ,ξ ∈W . By considering ξ arbitrarily large, this implies
V [Gβ ] ⊆ W , where Gβ is the generic filter at all coordinates β and higher, and so
W is an intermediate ZFC model between V [Gβ ] ⊆ W ⊆ V [G]. Since V [G] arises
via set forcing over V [Gβ ] by forcing with the coordinates up to and including β, we
conclude that V [Gβ ] is a deeper ground than W . Such grounds are therefore dense
below the grounds of V [G] and form a strictly descending sequence of order type
Ord. It follows that the grounds are set-directed and have no minimal member,
establishing the theorem. 
The class forcing extension V [G] of the previous theorem has the nice property
that for every ordinal α, we have V
V [G]
α = V
V [Gα]
α for some Gα that is set-generic
over V . So in a sense, V [G] is “close to V ”. Since the assumption that the uni-
verse is constructible from a set considerably simplifies the geology, the following is
an interesting strengthening of the previous theorem. The class forcing extension
constructed here will not be close to V in the previous sense, though.
Theorem 28. Every model of set theory has a class forcing extension of the form
L[r], where r ⊆ ω, in which there is no bedrock, but the grounds are downward
set-directed.
Proof. First of all, the grounds of any model of the form L[r] are downward set-
directed by theorem 20, so the final claim of the theorem will come for free.
The desired model L[r] is produced by Jensen coding, and the content of our
proof is the observation that this model has no bedrock. In the Jensen construction
(see [BJW82] for a standard reference), one passes first to a model (W,A), with
A ⊆ Ord specifically arranged so that HWα = Lα[A] whenever α is a cardinal of W .
One next extends W by forcing with Jensen’s class partial order P. Suppose that
G ⊆ P is W -generic, and let W ′ =W [G], which has the form L[r] for some real r in
W ′. The forcing G adds a class D ⊆ Ord such that W [G] = L[D]. If τ is a cardinal
SET-THEORETIC GEOLOGY 13
of W , then P splits as Pτ ∗ P
Dτ . The forcing Pτ is a class forcing coding V as a
set Dτ = D ∩ τ
+, in the sense that W [G ↾ Pτ ] = L[Dτ ], and P
Dτ is a set forcing,
essentially an iteration of almost disjoint coding, which brings the coding from τ+
down to ω in the sense that it codes Dτ as a subset D0 of ω. In particular, L[Dτ ]
is a ground of W ′. Furthermore, if τ ′ > τ is a larger cardinal of W , then L[Dτ ]
is a nontrivial set-forcing extension of L[Dτ ′], and so W
′ has class-many grounds.
Since W ′ = L[r] is constructible from a set, it follows from this and theorem 26
that the bedrock axiom fails there. 
Our most fundamental lack of knowledge about the mantle is that, without any
additional hypotheses, we do not yet know whether or not it is necessarily a model
of ZFC or even of ZF.
Question 29. Does the mantle necessarily satisfy ZF? Or ZFC?
One may of course restrict the concept of grounds to certain classes of forcing
notions. Thus, let us say that W is a σ-closed ground if W is a ground such that
the universe is obtainable from W by a σ-closed forcing P (note that P is σ-closed
in W if and only if it is so in V ). As a reminder, let us mention that by definition,
a ground must be a model of ZFC. The σ-closed mantle is simply the intersection
of all σ-closed grounds. More generally, we define the Γ-Mantle, for any definable
class Γ of forcing notions, to be the intersection of all grounds W for which V is
a forcing extension of W by a forcing notion in ΓW . Theorem 31 shows that the
σ-closed mantle need not be a model of ZFC, even if the universe is constructible
from a set. We will make use of the following folklore result, emphasizing that its
proof makes no use of the axiom of choice.
Lemma 30 ([Sol70, Lemma 2.5]). Assuming ZF, if G×H is V -generic for product
forcing P×Q, then V [G] ∩ V [H ] = V .
Proof. Certainly V ⊆ V [G]∩V [H ]. Conversely, suppose that x ∈ V [G]∩V [H ]. We
may assume by ∈-induction that x ⊆ V . By assumption, there is a P-name τ and
a Q-name σ such that x = τG = σH . So there must be a condition (p, q) ∈ G×H
forcing that τG = σH . We claim that p already decides the elements of τ . If not, we
could find V [H ]-generic filters G′ and G′′, both containing p, such that τG′ 6= τG′′ .
But both must be equal to σH , since G
′ ×H and G′′ ×H are both V -generic and
contain (p, q), a contradiction. Thus, p  τ ∈ Vˇ , and so x ∈ V . 
Theorem 31. If ZFC is consistent, then so is the theory consisting of the following
axioms:
(1) ZFC,
(2) V = L[A], for a set A ⊆ ω1,
(3) the σ-closed mantle is the same as L(R) and fails to satisfy the axiom of
choice.
Proof. Starting with a model of ZFC, we can pass to a forcing extension M whose
L(R) fails to satisfy the axiom of choice. For example, adding ℵ1 Cohen reals will
do this; see [Kun80, P. 245, ex. (E3) and (E4)]. The model L(R)M will satisfy
ZF + DC, though, since this always holds in the L(R) of a model of ZFC. Now let
a, b be mutually generic Cohen subsets of ω1 over L(R)
M . Since the Cohen forcing
at ω1 adds a well-ordering of R, it follows that L(R)[a] is a model of ZFC, and in fact
L(R)[a] = L[a]; and the same is true for L(R)[b] = L[b]. Note that since DC holds
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in L(R), adding a or b adds no new ω-sequences, and hence doesn’t change L(R).1
So we may unambiguously write L(R) for L(R)M = L(R)L(R)
M [a] = L(R)L(R)
M [b].
Consider now the model N = L(R)[a, b] = L[a, b]. Both L[a] and L[b] are σ-closed
grounds of N , and so the σ-closed mantle of N is contained in the intersection
of L(R)[a] and L(R)[b]. But since a and b are mutually generic, however, this
intersection is precisely L(R) by lemma 30. Conversely, L(R) is contained in every
σ-closed ground of N , since every such ground must contain all ω-sequences of
ordinals which are in N , and hence all the reals of N . So the σ-closed mantle of N
is precisely L(R)N , which is the L(R) we specifically arranged at the beginning to
violate the axiom of choice. 
The proof actually shows that every model V of ZFC has a forcing extension V
in which there is a set A ⊆ ω1, such that L[A] |= ZFC, but the σ-closed mantle of
L[A] is L(R)V and fails to satisfy the axiom of choice. Note also that statement
(2) of the previous theorem is optimal, in the sense that if V = L[r], where r ⊆ ω,
then trivially V is its own σ-closed mantle.
What we said about σ-closed geology remains true when restricting to the σ-
distributive notions. The underlying concept in this context is that a ground W is
a σ-distributive ground if there is a notion of forcing P ∈ W such that W thinks
that P is σ-distributive, and V is a forcing extension of W by P. Note that P might
fail to be σ-distributive in V in that case.
Question 32. Under what circumstances is the mantle also a ground model of the
universe? That is, when does the solid bedrock axiom hold?
Question 33. When does the universe remain a solid bedrock in all its forcing
extensions?
We regard this latter property, the forcing invariance of being a solid bedrock, as
an inner-model-like structural property, indicating when it holds that the universe is
highly regular or close to highly regular in some sense. For example, the property
holds in L, L[0♯], L[µ] and many other canonical models, and it is also an easy
consequence of CCA. Question 33 has an affirmative answer in exactly the models
that are their own generic mantle, a concept defined in section 3.
Let us conclude this section with a brief combinatorial analysis of the structure
of the grounds of the universe.
Theorem 34.
(1) The collection of grounds between a fixed ground W and the universe V is
an upper semi-lattice.
(2) If the grounds of V are downward directed, then the grounds of V are an
upper semi-lattice.
(3) In this case, however, the upper semi-lattice of grounds of V need not be a
complete upper semi-lattice, even if the universe is constructible from a set.
(4) The grounds of V need not be a lattice, even when the grounds are downward
set-directed, and even if the universe is constructible from a set. There can
be two grounds W0 and W1 whose intersection contains no largest model of
ZFC.
1It is an amusing observation of the first author that over ZF, the principle of dependent choices
is in fact equivalent to the statement that σ-closed forcing adds no new countable sequences of
ordinals.
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Proof. (1) By fact 11, any ZFC model betweenW and V is a forcing extensionW [G]
of W , and a ground of V . Suppose that W [G] and W [H ] are two such extensions,
with G ⊆ P ∈ W and H ⊆ Q ∈ W both W -generic and W [G],W [H ] ⊆ V .
Irrespective of mutual genericity concerns, in V we may form the object G×H , a
subset of P×Q ∈ W . Since P×Q is well-orderable in W , it follows that the model
W [G×H ], consisting of all sets constructible from elements ofW and G×H , is the
smallest model of ZFC containing W and G×H . This is a model of ZFC between
W and V ; it is a ground of V ; and clearly it contains both W [G] and W [H ]. Also,
any other model of ZFC containing both W [G] and W [H ] will contain W and G
and H and therefore also G × H , and so W [G × H ] is the least upper bound of
W [G] and W [H ], as desired.
(2) Suppose that the grounds of V are directed. If Wr and Ws are two grounds,
then there is some deeper ground Wt ⊆ Wr ∩Ws. By applying (1) to the grounds
between Wt and V , it follows that Wr and Ws have a least upper bound.
For (3) and (4), we force over L to construct a model having the desired features
for its grounds. Using Easton forcing, let P be the forcing over L to force 2ℵn =
ℵn+2 for all n < ω. More specifically, P is the full-support product of the forcing
Qn = Add(ℵn,ℵn+2), as defined in L. Suppose that G ⊆ P is L-generic for this
forcing. Next, we add a Cohen real c over L[G]. In the model V = L[G][c], we
construct two grounds, so as to witness (4). The first ground is simply L[G]. The
second is L[G ↾ c], where G ↾ c is the filter G restricted to the coordinates n with
n ∈ c, viewing c as a subset of ω. We claim that L[G] and L[G ↾ c] have no greatest
lower bound among the grounds. Suppose towards contradiction that W , a ground
of V , is the greatest lower bound of L[G] and L[G ↾ c]. As all cardinals are preserved
between L and L[G][c], it follows that the models W , L[G] and L[G ↾ c] have all
the same ℵn’s. Note that if n ∈ c, then L[G] and L[G ↾ c] both contain L[G(n)],
where G(n) is the part of the generic filter G on coordinate n, to pump up the GCH
at ℵn. Since L[G(n)] is a ground of both L[G] and L[G ↾ c] for such n, it follows
by our assumption on W being a greatest lower bound that L[G(n)] ⊆ W for any
n ∈ c. This implies that the GCH fails in W at every ℵn for which n ∈ c. If n /∈ c,
however, then the GCH must hold in W at ℵn, since it holds in L[G ↾ c] at these
ℵn, and cardinals are preserved. Thus, the GCH pattern in W on the ℵn’s exactly
conforms with the real c. But c is not in W , because it is not in L[G], contradicting
our assumption that W satisfied ZFC. Thus, we have proved that the grounds L[G]
and L[G ↾ c] can have no greatest lower bound, establishing (4). Statement (3)
follows on general lattice theoretic grounds, since if a downward directed upper
semi-lattice is complete with respect to joins, then for any pair of nodes, the join
of all lower bounds of these nodes will be a greatest lower bound, and so it would
be a lattice. By (4), it need not be a lattice, and so we conclude that (3), it need
not be complete as an upper semi-lattice. 
In particular, theorem 34 statement (4) provides an example of a model L[G][c]
having two grounds L[G] and L[G ↾ c] whose intersection is not a model of ZF.
Namely, the separation axiom fails in L[G] ∩ L[G ↾ c], since in this model one can
define the set of natural numbers n for which the power set of ℵn is not bijective with
ℵn+1, but this set corresponds exactly to c, which does not exist in L[G]∩L[G ↾ c].
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2. A brief upward glance
Set-theoretic geology naturally has a downward-oriented focus, towards deeper
grounds and mantles, but let us cast a brief upward glance in this section by con-
sidering several upwards closure issues. The second author heard the following
observation from Woodin in the early 1990s.
Observation 35. If W is a countable model of ZFC set theory, then there are
forcing extensions W [c] and W [d], both obtained by adding a Cohen real, which
are non-amalgamable in the sense that there can be no model of ZFC with the
same ordinals as W containing both W [c] and W [d]. Thus, the family of forcing
extensions of W is not upward directed.
Proof. Since W is countable, let z be a real coding the entirety of W . Enumerate
the dense subsets 〈Dn | n < ω〉 of the Cohen forcing Add(ω, 1) in W . We construct
c and d in stages. We begin by letting c0 be any element of D0. Let d0 consist of
exactly as many 0s as |c0|, followed by a 1, followed by z(0), and then extended to
an element of D0. Continuing, cn+1 extends cn by adding 0s until the length of dn,
and then a 1, and then extending into Dn+1; and dn+1 extends dn by adding 0s to
the length of cn+1, then a 1, then z(n), then extending into Dn+1. Let c = ∪cn
and d = ∪dn. Since we met all the dense sets in W , we know that c and d are
W -generic Cohen reals, and so we may form the forcing extensions W [c] and W [d].
But if W ⊆ U |= ZFC and both c and d are in U , then in U we may reconstruct
the map n 7→ 〈cn, dn〉, by giving attention to the blocks of 0s in c and d. From
this map, we may reconstruct z in U , which reveals all the ordinals of W to be
countable, a contradiction if U and W have the same ordinals. 
Let us remark that many of the results in this section concern forcing extensions
of an arbitrary countable model of set theory, which of course includes the case
of ill-founded models. Although there is no problem with forcing extensions of
ill-founded models, when properly carried out, the reader may prefer to focus on
the case of countable transitive models for the results in this section, and such a
perspective will lose very little of the point of our observations.
The method of observation 35 is easily generalized to produce three W -generic
Cohen reals c0, c1 and c2, such that any two of them can be amalgamated, but the
three of them cannot. More generally:
Observation 36. If W is a countable model of ZFC set theory, then for any finite
n there are W -generic Cohen reals c0, c1, . . . , cn−1, such that any proper subset of
them are mutually W -generic, so that one may form the generic extension W [~c],
provided that ~c omits at least one ci, but there is no forcing extension W [G] simulta-
neously extending all W [ci] for i < n. In particular, the sequence 〈c0, c1, . . . , cn−1〉
cannot be added by forcing over W .
Let us turn now to infinite linearly ordered sequences of forcing extensions. We
show first in theorem 37 and observation 38 that one mustn’t ask for too much;
but nevertheless, in theorem 39 we prove the surprising positive result, that any
increasing sequence of forcing extensions over a countable model W , with forcing
of uniformly bounded size, is bounded above by a single forcing extension W [G].
SET-THEORETIC GEOLOGY 17
Theorem 37. If W is a countable model of ZFC, then there is an increasing se-
quence of set-forcing extensions of W having no upper bound in the generic multi-
verse of W .
W [G0] ⊆W [G1] ⊆ · · · ⊆W [Gn] ⊆ · · ·
Proof. SinceW is countable, there is an increasing sequence 〈γn | n < ω〉 of ordinals
that is cofinal in the ordinals of W . Let Gn be W -generic for the collapse forcing
Coll(ω, γn), as defined in W . (By absorbing the smaller forcing, we may arrange
that W [Gn] contains Gm for m < n.) Since every ordinal of W is eventually
collapsed, there can be no set-forcing extension of W , and indeed, no model with
the same ordinals as W , that contains every W [Gn]. 
But that was cheating, of course, since the sequence of forcing notions is not even
definable in W , as the class { γn | n < ω } is not a class of W . A more intriguing
question would be whether this phenomenon can occur with forcing notions that
constitute a set in W , or (equivalently, actually) whether it can occur using always
the same poset in W . For example, if W [c0] ⊆W [c0][c1] ⊆W [c0][c1][c2] ⊆ · · · is an
increasing sequence of generic extensions of W by adding Cohen reals, then does it
follow that there is a set-forcing extension W [G] of W with W [c0] · · · [cn] ⊆ W [G]
for every n? For this, we begin by showing that one mustn’t ask for too much:
Observation 38. If W is a countable model of ZFC, then there is a sequence
of forcing extensions W ⊆ W [c0] ⊆ W [c0][c1] ⊆ W [c0][c1][c2] ⊆ · · · , adding a
Cohen real at each step, such that there is no forcing extension of W containing
the sequence 〈cn | n < ω〉.
Proof. Let 〈dn | n < ω〉 be any W -generic sequence for the forcing to add ω many
Cohen reals over W . Let z be any real coding the ordinals of W . Let us view
these reals as infinite binary sequences. Define the real cn to agree with dn on all
digits except the initial digit, and set cn(0) = z(n). That is, we make a single-bit
change to each dn, so as to code one additional bit of z. Since we have made only
finitely many changes to each dn, it follows that cn is an W -generic Cohen real,
and also W [c0] · · · [cn] = W [d0] · · · [dn]. Thus, we have W ⊆ W [c0] ⊆ W [c0][c1] ⊆
W [c0][c1][c2] ⊆ · · · , adding a generic Cohen real at each step. But there can be
no forcing extension of W containing 〈cn | n < ω〉, since any such extension would
have the real z, revealing all the ordinals of W to be countable. 
We can modify the construction to allow z to be W -generic, but collapsing some
cardinals of W . For example, for any cardinal δ of W , we could let z be W -generic
for the collapse of δ. Then, if we construct the sequence 〈cn | n < ω〉 as above, but
inside W [z], we get a sequence of Cohen real extensions W ⊆W [c0] ⊆W [c0][c1] ⊆
W [c0][c1][c2] ⊆ · · · such that W [〈cn | n < ω〉] =W [z], which collapses δ.
But of course, the question of whether the modelsW [c0][c1] · · · [cn] have an upper
bound is not the same question as whether one can add the sequence 〈cn | n < ω〉,
since an upper bound may not have this sequence. And in fact, this is exactly what
occurs, and we have a surprising positive result:
Theorem 39. Suppose that W is a countable model of ZFC, and
W [G0] ⊆W [G1] ⊆ · · · ⊆W [Gn] ⊆ · · ·
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is an increasing sequence of forcing extensions of W , with Gn ⊆ Qn ∈ W being
W -generic. If the cardinalities of the Qn’s in W are bounded in W , then there is a
set-forcing extension W [G] with W [Gn] ⊆W [G] for all n < ω.
Proof. Let us first make the argument in the special case that we have
W ⊆W [g0] ⊆W [g0][g1] ⊆ · · · ⊆W [g0][g1] · · · [gn] ⊆ · · · ,
where each gn is generic over the prior model for forcing Qn ∈ W . That is, each
extension W [g0][g1] · · · [gn] is obtained by product forcing Q0 × · · · × Qn over W ,
and the gn are mutually W -generic. Let δ be a regular cardinal with each Qn
having size at most δ, built with underlying set a subset of δ. In W , let θ = 2δ, let
〈Rα | α < θ〉 enumerate all posets of size at most δ, with unbounded repetition, and
let P =
∏
α<θ Rα be the finite-support product of these posets. Since each factor is
δ+-c.c., it follows that the product is δ+-c.c. Since W is countable, we may build
a filter H ⊆ P that is W -generic. In fact, we may find such a filter H ⊆ P that
meets every dense set in
⋃
n<ωW [g0][g1] · · · [gn], since this union is also countable.
In particular, H and g0 × · · · × gn are mutually W -generic for every n < ω. The
filter H is determined by the filters Hα ⊆ Rα that it adds at each coordinate.
Next comes the key step. Externally to W , we may find an increasing sequence
〈θn | n < ω〉 of ordinals cofinal in θ, such that Rθn = Qn. This is possible because
the posets are repeated unboundedly, and θ is countable in V . Let us modify the
filter H by surgery to produce a new filter H∗, by changing H at the coordinates
θn to use gn rather than Hθn . That is, let H
∗
θn
= gn and otherwise H
∗
α = Hα, for
α /∈ { θn | n < ω }. It is clear that H
∗ is still a filter on P. We claim that H∗ is
W -generic. To see this, suppose that A ⊆ P is any maximal antichain in W . By
the δ+-chain condition and the fact that cof(θ)W > δ, it follows that the conditions
in A have support bounded by some γ < θ. Since the θn are increasing and cofinal
in θ, only finitely many of them lay below γ, and we may suppose that there is
some largest θm below γ. Let H
∗∗ be the filter derived from H by performing
the surgical modifications only on the coordinates θ0, . . . , θm. Thus, H
∗ and H∗∗
agree on all coordinates below γ. By construction, we had ensured that H and
g0 × · · · × gm are mutually generic over W for the forcing P × Q0 × · · ·Qm. This
poset has an automorphism swapping the latter copies of Qi with their copy at θi
in P, and this automorphism takes the W -generic filter H×g0×· · ·×gm exactly to
H∗∗×Hθ0×· · ·×Hθm . In particular, H
∗∗ isW -generic for P, and so H∗∗ meets the
maximal antichain A. Since H∗ and H∗∗ agree at coordinates below γ, it follows
that H∗ also meets A. In summary, we have proved that H∗ isW -generic for P, and
soW [H∗] is a set-forcing extension ofW . By design, each gn appears at coordinate
θn in H
∗, and so W [g0] · · · [gn] ⊆W [H
∗] for every n < ω, as desired.
Finally, we reduce the general case to this special case. Suppose that W [G0] ⊆
W [G1] ⊆ · · · ⊆ W [Gn] ⊆ · · · is an increasing sequence of forcing extensions of W ,
with Gn ⊆ Qn ∈ W being W -generic and each Qn of size at most κ in W . By
the standard facts surrounding finite iterated forcing, we may view each model as
a forcing extension of the previous model
W [Gn+1] =W [Gn][Hn],
whereHn isW [Gn]-generic for the corresponding quotient forcingQn/Gn inW [Gn].
Let g ⊆ Coll(ω, κ) be
⋃
nW [Gn]-generic for the collapse of κ, so that it is mutu-
ally generic with every Gn. Thus, we have the increasing sequence of extensions
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W [g][G0] ⊆W [g][G1] ⊆ · · · , where we have added g to each model. Since eachQn is
countable in W [g], it is forcing equivalent there to the forcing to add a Cohen real.
Furthermore, the quotient forcing Qn/Gn is also forcing equivalent in W [g][Gn]
to adding a Cohen real. Thus, W [g][Gn+1] = W [g][Gn][Hn] = W [g][Gn][hn],
for some W [g][Gn]-generic Cohen real hn. Unwrapping this recursion, we have
W [g][Gn+1] =W [g][G0][h1] · · · [hn], and consequently
W [g] ⊆W [g][G0] ⊆W [g][G0][h1] ⊆W [g][G0][h1][h2] ⊆ · · · ,
which places us into the first case of the proof, since this is now product forcing
rather than iterated forcing. 
Definition 40. A collection {W [Gn] | n < ω } of forcing extensions ofW is finitely
amalgamable over W if for every n < ω there is a forcing extension W [H ] with
W [Gm] ⊆ W [H ] for all m ≤ n. It is amalgamable over W if there is W [H ] such
that W [Gn] ⊆W [H ] for all n < ω.
The next corollary shows that we cannot improve the non-amalgamability result
of observation 36 to the case of infinitely many Cohen reals, with all finite subsets
amalgamable.
Corollary 41. IfW is a countable model of ZFC and {W [Gn] | n < ω } is a finitely
amalgamable collection of forcing extensions of W , using forcing of bounded size in
W , then this collection is fully amalgamable. That is, there is a forcing extension
W [H ] with W [Gn] ⊆W [H ] for all n < ω.
Proof. Since the collection is finitely amalgamable, for each n < ω there is someW -
genericK such thatW [Gm] ⊆W [K] for allm ≤ n. Thus, we may form the minimal
model W [G0][G1] · · · [Gn] between W and W [K], and thus W [G0][G1] · · · [Gn] is a
forcing extension of W . We are thus in the situation of theorem 39, with an
increasing chain of forcing extensions.
W ⊆W [G0] ⊆W [G0][G1] ⊆ · · · ⊆W [G0][G1] · · · [Gn] ⊆ · · ·
Therefore, by theorem 39, there is a model W [H ] containing all these extensions,
and in particular, W [Gn] ⊆W [H ], as desired. 
3. The generic mantle
Let us turn now to a somewhat enlarged context, where we have found an in-
triguing and perhaps more robust version of the mantle. The concept is inspired by
[Fuc08], where the generic HOD is introduced, a topic we shall explore further in
section 4. The idea is to consider not only the grounds of V , but also the grounds of
the forcing extensions of V . A generic ground of V is a ground of some set-forcing
extension of V , that is, a model W having V [G] = W [H ] for some V -generic filter
G ⊆ P ∈ V and W -generic filter H ⊆ Q ∈ W . This is equivalent to saying that V
andW have a common forcing extension, and this is therefore a symmetric relation.
The generic mantle of V is the intersection of all generic grounds of V . Since this
includes V itself, as well as every ground of V , it follows that the generic mantle of
V will be included in V and indeed, in the mantle of V .
Definition 42. The generic mantle, denoted gM, is the class of all x such that
every forcing notion P forces that xˇ belongs to every ground of V P. That is,
gM = { x | ∀P 1 P ∀r xˇ ∈ Wr },
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where Wr is the ground of the forcing extension defined by parameter r using the
uniform definition of theorem 12 applied in the forcing extension. Equivalently,
gM = { x | ∀P1 P xˇ ∈ M },
where M defines the mantle as interpreted in the forcing extension.
In particular, the generic mantle is uniformly definable without parameters. If P
is a poset, we shall write MP for the class {x | 1 P xˇ ∈ M}, so that gM =
⋂
PM
P.
Observation 43. gM =
⋂
αM
Coll(ω,α).
Proof. The inclusion from left to right is trivial, as the intersection on the right
ranges only over a subclass of all forcing notions. For the reverse inclusion, suppose
that x ∈
⋂
αM
Coll(ω,α), and let P be an arbitrary poset, of some cardinality α. It
follows that P×Coll(ω, α) is forcing equivalent to Coll(ω, α), and so x ∈ MColl(ω,α) =
MP×Coll(ω,α). But MP×Coll(ω,α) ⊆ MP, as is easily verified, so we are done. 
In many models of set theory, the generic mantle and the mantle coincide, and
although we have introduced them as distinct concepts, we do not actually know
them to be different, for we have no model yet in which we know them to differ
(see question 60). We introduce the generic mantle in part because the evidence
indicates that it may be a more robust notion. For example, we are able to prove
that the generic mantle satisfies the ZF axioms of set theory without needing the
directedness hypotheses of theorem 22.
Theorem 44. The generic mantle of V is a definable transitive class in V , con-
taining all ordinals, invariant under set forcing, and a model of the ZF axioms of
set theory.
Proof. The generic mantle is a definable transitive class containing all ordinals and
closed under the Go¨del operations, because it is the intersection of the generic
grounds, each of which has those closure properties in the corresponding extension
of V . So by fact 10, in order to show that gM is an inner model, it remains to show
merely that it is almost universal, which we do below.
Let’s first prove that gM is invariant under set forcing, meaning that if V [G]
is a forcing extension of V by set forcing P, then gMV = gMV [G]. Observe first
that every ground model of a forcing extension of V [G] is also a ground model
of a forcing extension of V . Thus, the generic mantle of V [G] is the intersection
of a sub-collection of the models used to form the generic mantle of V , and so
gMV ⊆ gMV [G]. For the reverse inclusion, suppose that x /∈ gMV . Thus, there
is a forcing extension V [H ] via some forcing notion Q for which there is a ground
W ⊆ V [H ] that does not contain x. There is a condition q ∈ H forcing that W
is like this. By forcing below q with Q over V [G], we may assume that H is not
merely V -generic, but also V [G]-generic, and consequently that G×H is V -generic
for the product forcing. Thus, W is also a ground of V [H ][G], which is the same as
V [G][H ], and so we have found a forcing extension of V [G] that has a ground W
that omits x. So x /∈ gMV [G] and so gMV = gMV [G], establishing that the generic
mantle is invariant by set forcing.
To see that the generic mantle is a model of ZF, we claim first that Vα∩gM ∈ gM,
for every α. It is clear for any ground W that Vα ∩ gM = V
W
α ∩ gM
W ∈ W , by
the forcing invariance of gM. Since this is true for every ground, it follows that
Vα∩gM ∈M. And so we have shown in ZFC that for every α, we have Vα∩gM ∈M.
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So this is true in every forcing extension, which again by the forcing absoluteness
of gM (and of Vα ∩ gM) means that Vα ∩ gM ∈ M
Coll(ω,γ), for every γ and every
α. So Vα ∩ gM ∈ gM, for every α, by observation 43. It now follows that if A is a
subset of gM of rank α, then A ⊆ Vα ∩ gM ∈ gM, and so gM is almost universal
and hence is an inner model, as desired. 
The generic mantle of a model of set theory seems most naturally considered
in a broad context that includes all of the forcing extensions of that model, their
ground models, the forcing extensions of those models, and so on. Woodin [Woo04a]
introduced the concept of the generic multiverse of a model U of set theory, the
smallest collection of models containing U and closed under forcing extensions and
grounds, and this seems to be an ideal context in which to undertake our project of
set-theoretic geology. The generic multiverse naturally partitions the larger multi-
verse of models of set theory into equivalence (meta)classes, consisting of models
reachable from one another by passing to forcing extensions and ground models.
Because the generic multiverse concept is clearly second-order or higher-order,
however, there are certain difficulties of formalization and meta-mathematical issues
that need to be addressed. This is particularly true when one wants to consider
the generic multiverse of the full set-theoretic universe V , rather than merely the
generic multiverse of a toy countable model. The standard approaches to second-
order set theory, after all, such as Go¨del-Bernays set theory or Kelly-Morse set
theory, do not seem to provide a direct account of the generic multiverse of V ,
whose forcing extensions are of course not directly available, even as GBC or KM
classes.
Nevertheless, it turns out that many of the natural questions one might want
to ask about the generic multiverse of V can in fact be formalized in first-order
ZFC set theory, and since we are indeed principally interested in the features of the
generic multiverse of the full set-theoretic universe V , we shall prefer to formalize
our concepts this way whenever this is possible, so that they would be available for
that purpose. For example, even though a naive treatment of the generic mantle
would seem to present difficulties arising from the fact that we do not have full access
inside V to the forcing extensions of V and to their respective grounds, we have
nevertheless proved above that the generic mantle is a definable class in V , and that
it is invariant by forcing over any model and to any ground. Thus, it is entirely a
first-order project to state that the generic mantle satisfies a given statement or has
such-and-such relation to other definable classes, and such questions can therefore
be investigated without any meta-mathematical difficulties.
The standard treatments of forcing over V , such as the method of working under
the forcing relation, the method of Boolean-valued models or the naturalist account
of forcing (see [HS]), provide a first-order means of treating truth in the forcing
extensions of V . Thus, it is a first-order statement of set theory to state that a given
assertion ϕ holds in some forcing extension of V (and thus the modal assertions
in the modal logic of forcing as in [HL08] are all first-order expressible). Iterating
this method, one can similarly state in an entirely first-order manner whether ϕ
holds in every forcing extension of every ground of every forcing extension of V , or
whether a given set x is an element of all such models, and so on. In this way, we
see that many natural questions about the nature of the generic multiverse of V
are actually first-order questions about V .
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Nevertheless, it is sometimes illuminating to consider the generic multiverse of
a model in a context where we can legitimately grasp the generic multiverse as a
whole, rather than only from the filtered perspective of one of the models in it. In
these circumstances, we temporarily adopt what we call the toy model perspective.
In this method, which is analogous to the countable-transitive-model approach to
forcing as opposed to the various forcing-over-V approaches, one has a countable
model W of ZFC, and one considers the collection of all forcing extensions of W ,
as constructed in the current set-theoretic background universe V , as well as the
grounds of these universes and their forcing extensions and so on, forming ultimately
the smallest collection of models closed under the forcing extensions and grounds
that are available. The particular generic multiverse ofW therefore depends on the
set-theoretic background in which it is constructed; if we were to force over V to
add a Cohen real c, for example, then for a given countable transitive modelW , the
generic multiverse of W as computed in V [c] will include W [c], but in V this model
is of course not available. In any case, the generic multiverse of a countable model
W will be a family of continuum many models, essentially a set of reals under a
suitable coding scheme. With the generic multiverse thus becoming concrete for a
given toy model W , one may now imagine living inside W , treating it as the full
universe and using that constructed generic multiverse as the generic multiverse of
it.
It is essentially the toy model approach that one uses, for example, when under-
taking forcing only with countable transitive models. Although this way of doing
forcing was formerly quite common, it has now largely been supplanted with the
various formalizations of forcing in ZFC, which enable one to make sense of forcing
over an arbitrary model of ZFC. Since as we have mentioned we are principally
interested in the questions of set-theoretic geology and the generic multiverse in
the context of the full set-theoretic universe V , we intend to fall back on the toy
approach only as a last resort, when it may not be clear how a given concept might
be formalized. For example, we adopted the toy model approach in observation 35,
since it is unclear how to formalize that assertion as a claim about the generic multi-
verse of the full universe V . Similarly, the inner model hypothesis IMH of [Fri06]
is formalized via the toy model approach, because it is unclear how to formalize it
as a claim about the full universe V .
The models of the generic multiverse can be specified by the corresponding finite
zigzag sequence of forcing extensions and ground models on the path leading to it
from the original model; let us say that 〈U0, U1, . . . , Uk〉 is a multiverse path leading
from U0 to Uk if each Ui+1 is either a forcing extension or a ground model of Ui.
Woodin has argued that any statement true in a model of the generic multiverse is
true already in a model reachable by a multiverse path of length at most three from
any fixed original model, specifically, in a forcing extension of a ground model of a
forcing extension of the original model.2 This three-steps-away fact (or indeed, any
finite bound on the number of steps) allows us to express in a first-order manner the
generic-multiverse “possibility” modality ♦ϕ, asserting that ϕ is generic-multiverse
possible, that is, that ϕ is true in some model of the generic multiverse. This is
2In [Woo04a], he appears to make the stronger claim that the models themselves are reachable
in three steps, but in personal conversation with the second author, he clarified this to the claim
we have just stated here. Meanwhile, under the hypothesis of theorem 50, every model in the
generic multiverse of V is reachable in only two steps, as a ground extension of V .
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because by the three-step fact, ♦ϕ is equivalent to the assertion that there is a
forcing notion P forcing that there is a ground having a forcing notion forcing ϕ
over that ground. These forcing modalities are further explored in [HL08], [HLL],
[HL13], with the latter article specifically treating the interaction of the upward
and downward forcing possibility modalities and offering improvements and further
results on this particular issue.
Woodin introduced the generic multiverse in [Woo04a] in part to make a philo-
sophical argument against a certain view of mathematical truth, namely, truth as
true-in-the-generic-multiverse. Although we investigate the generic multiverse, we
do not hold this view of truth. Rather, we are attempting to understand the fun-
damental features of the generic multiverse, a task we place at the foundation of
any deep understanding of forcing, and we consider the generic multiverse to be
the natural and illuminating background context for our project of set-theoretic
geology. Apart from any grand Platonist-multiverse view of truth, we find that
the ordinary Tarskian view of truth, considered individually within each model of
the multiverse, is sufficient to provide a global understanding of truth across the
multiverse, for the definability of the forcing relation gives every model access to
the truth concepts of its forcing extensions, and conversely, the ground-model de-
finability theorem gives every forcing extension direct access to its grounds. Our
view is that the generic multiverse is a grand new set-theoretic context for us to
explore: what are the features of the generic multiverse? What is or can it be like?
This is what set-theoretic geology is about.3
Corollary 45. The generic mantle is constant across the generic multiverse. In-
deed, the generic mantle is the intersection of the generic multiverse.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of theorem 44. Specifically, since the
generic mantle is invariant by set forcing, it is preserved as one moves either from a
ground to a forcing extension or from a forcing extension to a ground. Since these
are the operations that generate the multiverse, all the models in the multiverse
have the same generic mantle. This means, in particular, that the generic mantle is
contained within the intersection of the multiverse. Conversely, the generic mantle
is defined to be the intersection of some of the models of the multiverse, and so the
intersection of the multiverse is contained within the generic mantle. Thus, they
are equal. 
Corollary 46. The generic mantle is the largest forcing-invariant definable class.
Proof. We have argued above that the generic mantle is a forcing-invariant definable
class in any model of set theory. Any other class that is definable and invariant
by forcing over any model of set theory will be preserved to any forcing extension
V [G] and then to any subsequent ground W of V [G], and therefore be contained
within the generic mantle. So the generic mantle is the largest such forcing-invariant
class. 
To our way of thinking, the previous corollary identifies the generic mantle as
a highly canonical object, the largest forcing-invariant definable class. Because
3Haim Gaifman has pointed out (with humor) that the term ‘set-theoretic geology’ suggests
a Platonist view of forcing as a natural process or force of nature, and that for those who view
forcing as an intentional human activity, the alternative term should be ‘set-theoretic archeology.’
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of this, we would expect it to become a focus of attention for those set theorists
interested in forcing and models of set theory.
We would like now to consider the downward-directed grounds hypothesis as it
arises in connection not only with the grounds of V , but with the grounds of the
forcing extensions of V . Recall that the generic grounds of a model are the grounds
of its forcing extensions. We say that the grounds are dense below the generic
grounds, if every generic ground contains a ground. This concept is first-order
expressible in set theory as the assertion that for every poset P and every P-name
r˙, every condition in P forces “there is an index s ∈ Vˇ such that (Ws)
Vˇ ⊆Wr˙”. A
ground extension of V is a forcing extension of a ground of V , or in other words,
a model having a common ground with V ; all such models have the form Wr[G]
for some Wr-generic filter G ⊆ P ∈ Wr , but we may not assume here that G is
V -generic.
Lemma 47. Any generic ground of V that is contained in V is a ground of V .
Proof. If W is a ground of a forcing extension V [G] and W ⊆ V ⊆ V [G], then by
lemma 11 it follows that W is a ground of V . 
What we don’t know, more generally, is the following analogue of lemma 47 for
models in the generic multiverse.
Question 48. If W is in the generic multiverse of V and W ⊆ V , must W be a
ground of V ? In other words, for models within the same generic multiverse, is the
inclusion relation the same as the “is a ground model of” relation?
The answer is yes if the grounds are dense in the multiverse, since then every
model in the multiverse contained in V is trapped between a ground of V and V ,
and hence is itself a ground by lemma 47.
Theorem 49. The following are equivalent.
(1) The DDG holds. That is, the grounds of V are downward directed.
(2) The DDG holds in some forcing extension of V .
(3) The DDG holds in every ground of V .
Proof. Since V is a forcing extension of itself, the implications 1→2 and 3→1 are
immediate. For 2→3, suppose that the grounds of a forcing extension V [G] are
downward directed and that W and W ′ are grounds of U , which is a ground of V .
Thus, W and W ′ are also grounds of V [G], and so by 2 there is some ground W¯ of
V [G] with W¯ ⊆ W ∩W ′. Since W¯ ⊆ U ⊆ V [G], it follows by lemma 47 that W¯ is
a ground of U , and so 3 holds. 
Consider now in contrast the generic DDG, which asserts that the DDG holds
in all forcing extensions.
Theorem 50. The following are equivalent.
(1) The generic DDG holds. That is, in every forcing extension of V , the
grounds are downward directed.
(2) The grounds of V are downward directed and dense below the generic
grounds.
(3) The grounds of V are downward directed and dense below the grounds of
every ground extension.
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Proof. (1→ 3) Suppose that the grounds of every forcing extension of V are down-
ward directed. In particular, since V is a forcing extension of itself, the grounds
of V are downward directed. Suppose that W is a ground of a ground extension
Wr[G], where G ⊆ P ∈ Wr is Wr-generic. Thus, W has the form W =W
Wr [G]
t for
some parameter t ∈Wr[G], having a suitable P-name with t = t˙G.
If we temporarily imagine that G is actually V -generic for the forcing P, then
we may also form V [G] and notice that Wr[G] is a ground of V [G]. In this case,
V , W and Wr are all grounds of V [G], and so by our assumption there is a ground
W
V [G]
s contained in each of them. By lemma 47, it follows that W
V [G]
s is a ground
of V , which we may therefore denote simply by Ws, as well as a ground of Wr.
Thus, in this case where G is V -generic, we have found the desired groundWs of V
contained inW . SinceWr[G] can see thatWs ⊆W
Wr [G]
t˙G
, there must be a condition
p ∈ P forcing this property about s over Wr. Furthermore, by arguing the same
below any given condition, Wr can see that the set of such p having such an s is
dense in P.
If we now drop the assumption that G is V -generic, we may nevertheless assume
by genericity that there is a condition p ∈ G with s as above, ensuring that WWrs ⊆
W . But WWrs is a ground of Wr and therefore a ground of V . So we have found a
ground of V in W , as desired for 3.
(3 → 2) This is immediate, since any ground of a forcing extension of V is a
ground of a ground extension, since V is a ground of itself.
(2→ 1) Suppose that the grounds of V are downward directed and dense below
the generic grounds, and suppose that V [G] is a forcing extension of V , with grounds
W
V [G]
r and W
V [G]
s . Since the grounds are dense below the generic grounds, we may
find groundsWr′ and Ws′ with Wr′ ⊆W
V [G]
r and Ws′ ⊆W
V [G]
s . Since the grounds
are downward directed, there is a ground Wt with Wt ⊆ Wr′ ∩ Ws′ , and this is
contained in W
V [G]
r ∩W
V [G]
s . Since Wt is also a ground of V [G], we conclude that
the grounds of V [G] are downward directed, as desired. 
Corollary 51. If the generic DDG holds, then
(1) the mantle is the same as the generic mantle;
(2) the class of ground extensions is closed under forcing extensions and grounds;
(3) and consequently, the generic multiverse of V consists of the ground exten-
sions of V .
Proof. Suppose that the generic DDG holds. By theorem 50, the grounds are
dense below the generic grounds, and so the mantle and generic mantle coincide,
establishing statement (1). By the same theorem, any ground W of a ground
extension Wr[G] contains some ground Ws of both V and Wr, and so Ws ⊆ W ⊆
Wr[G]. Since Ws is a ground of Wr[G], it follows by lemma 47 that W is a forcing
extension of Ws, and so W is a ground extension of V . Thus, the collection of
ground extensions of V is closed under grounds and also (clearly) under forcing
extensions, establishing statement (2). Statement (3) now follows easily. 
Theorem 52. If there is a model of ZFC, then there is a model of ZFC having a
ground extension that is not a generic ground. In particular, the generic grounds
of such a model do not exhaust its generic multiverse.
Proof. Suppose that W is a countable model of ZFC and consider the non-amal-
gamable extensions W [c] and W [d] arising in observation 35. Focus on the model
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W [c], and observe that the model W [d] is a forcing extension of a ground of W [c],
but there can be no extension W [c][G] of which W [d] is a ground, since any such
extension would amalgamate W [c] and W [d]. 
On the positive side, it is also relatively consistent with ZFC that the generic
grounds do exhaust the generic multiverse. This is true in L, for example, since
the generic multiverse of L consists precisely of the forcing extensions of L. We
say that a generic ground W is a generic bedrock if it is minimal among the generic
grounds (meaning that there is no generic ground which is properly contained in it)
and it is a solid generic bedrock if it is least among the generic grounds (meaning
that it is contained in every generic ground). Since a generic bedrock is contained
in the generic ground V , it follows by lemma 47 that it is a ground, and it is
straightforward to formalize the statement that a groundWs is a bedrock or a solid
bedrock. Let the solid generic bedrock axiom assert that there is a solid generic
bedrock. By lemma 47 again, the solid generic bedrock axiom is equivalent to
the assertion that the generic mantle is a ground (and one may take this as the
formal definition of this axiom). In the presence of the solid generic bedrock axiom,
of course, the generic grounds will be downward set-directed, and furthermore, the
generic multiverse will consist precisely of the forcing extensions of the solid generic
bedrock.
Let us consider now the set-directed analogue of theorem 50.
Theorem 53. The following are equivalent
(1) The generic strong DDG holds. That is, in every forcing extension of V ,
the grounds are downward set-directed.
(2) The grounds of V are downward set-directed and dense below the generic
grounds.
(3) The grounds of V are downward set-directed and dense below the grounds
of every ground extension.
Proof. (1→ 3) If in every forcing extension, the grounds are downward set-directed,
then in particular in V they are downward set directed. And they are dense below
the grounds of any ground extension by theorem 50, since the generic strong DDG
implies the generic DDG, so statement 3 holds.
(3→ 2) This is immediate, since every generic ground is trivially a ground of a
ground extension, since V is a ground of V .
(2→ 1) Suppose that the grounds are downward set-directed and every generic
ground contains a ground. Consider any forcing extension V [G], where G ⊆ P is
V -generic, and any set I of indices in V [G], giving rise to the generic groundsW
V [G]
r
for r ∈ I. By our assumption, for every such r ∈ I there is t ∈ V withWt ⊆W
V [G]
r .
If r˙ is a name for r, then there is a condition p ∈ G forcing that W Vˇ
tˇ
⊆W
Vˇ [G˙]
r˙ . Fix
a name I˙ for I that is full, in the sense that whenever [[ r˙0 ∈ I˙ ]] 6= 0, then there
is r˙ ∈ dom(I˙) such that [[ r˙0 = r˙ ]] = 1. By collecting the witnesses t as above for
each r˙ ∈ dom(I˙) and condition p ∈ P, we may find a set J ∈ V such that whenever
p  r˙ ∈ I˙, then there is q ≤ p and t ∈ J such that q  W Vˇ
tˇ
⊆ W
Vˇ [G˙]
r˙ . A simple
density argument now shows that for every r ∈ I, there is t ∈ J with Wt ⊆W
V [G]
r .
Next, by the downward directedness of the grounds in V , there is a single ground
Ws contained in Wt for all t ∈ J and hence also in W
V [G]
r for every r ∈ I. Since
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Wt is a ground of V and hence also of V [G], we have therefore established that the
grounds of V [G] are downward directed, as desired. 
Consider now the local version of downward directedness. Extending our previ-
ous terminology, let us define the local DDG hypothesis as the assertion that the
grounds are locally downward directed, meaning that for every r and s and every
set B there is t with Wt ∩ B ⊆ Wr ∩Ws; the strong local DDG asserts that the
grounds are locally downward set-directed, meaning that for every set I and set B
there is t with Wt ∩ B ⊆
⋂
r∈IWr; and the generic strong local DDG asserts that
this holds in every forcing extension.
Theorem 54. If the generic strong local DDG holds, then the generic mantle is a
model of ZFC.
Proof. We already know by theorem 44 that the generic mantle gM satisfies ZF.
Unfortunately, we cannot apply corollary 24 directly here in order to prove the
axiom of choice holds in the generic mantle, because the generic grounds are not
classes in V . But we can adapt the argument of theorem 22. Assume toward
contradiction that y is a member of gM which has no well-order in gM. Let R be
the set of well-orders of y. Since none of these are in gM, we may find for each
r ∈ R a poset Pr which forces “rˇ /∈ M
V [G˙r],” where G˙r is the canonical Pr-name
of the generic filter. Let P =
∏
r Pr be the full-support product of these forcing
notions and suppose G ⊆ P is V -generic. In V [G], we have the extension V [Gr]
arising from coordinate r, and by the choice of Pr it follows that r is not in the
mantle of V [Gr ], and hence also not in the mantle of V [G]. Thus, in V [G], for
each r ∈ R we may find a ground W
V [G]
tr
omitting r. Since we have assumed that
the grounds of V [G] are locally downward set directed, there is a single ground
W ⊆ V [G] omitting every r ∈ R. Since y ∈ gMV , it follows that y ∈ W , but we
have proved that y has no well-ordering in W , contrary to W |= ZFC. 
The generic strong local DDG follows of course from the generic strong DDG,
which we have mentioned holds trivially in L, for example, simply because L is a
ground below any ground of any forcing extension of L. In other words, L is a solid
generic bedrock. There are many other models having this feature, but we do not
fully know the extent of the phenomenon.
Question 55. When does the universe have a solid generic bedrock? In other
words, under what circumstances is the generic mantle also a ground model of the
universe?
This phenomenon is not universal, in light of the following.
Corollary 56. Every model V of ZFC has a class forcing extension V [G] that
satisfies the generic strong local DDG, but which has no bedrock and no generic
bedrock.
Proof. This is a corollary to theorem 27. We first move to V satisfying the CCA.
Then, we perform an Easton support product P adding a Cohen subset over V to
every regular cardinal λ for which 2<λ = λ. Suppose that V [G] is the resulting
extension, and that V [G][g] is obtained by further set forcing over V [G]. If W is
a ground of V [G][g], then since the sets in V remain coded unboundedly in the
GCH pattern of V [G][g], it follows that V ⊆ W . Since V [G][g] is obtained by set
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forcing over W , it follows that for λ above the size of this forcing, since the generic
sets added by P at stage λ have all their initial segments in V and hence in W ,
that these generic objects must be already in W . It follows as in theorem 27 that
V [Gα] ⊆ W ⊆ V [G][g] for some sufficiently large α. Thus, once again the models
V [Gα] form a strictly descending sequence of grounds, which are dense below the
generic grounds of V [G]. It follows that the generic grounds are downward set-
directed, but there is no minimal ground or generic ground, as desired. 
As before, this can be strengthened by the following corollary to theorem 28.
Again, the model obtained there does not have the property that every set in it is
set-generic over V , in contradistinction to the one constructed above.
Corollary 57. Every model of set theory has a class forcing extension of the form
L[r], where r ⊆ ω, which satisfies the generic strong local DDG, but which has no
bedrock or generic bedrock.
Proof. This is a consequence of theorem 28. Starting with an arbitrary model of
set theory, by that theorem, there is a proper class forcing extension of the form
L[r] in which the bedrock axiom fails. Since this model is constructible from a set,
we know by theorem 20 that the generic grounds are downward set-directed.
Now the original argument showing that L[r] has no bedrock also shows that it
has no generic bedrock. The point is that any forcing extension L[r][g] of L[r] has
class many grounds, just like L[r], as any ground of L[r] is a ground of L[r][g]. But
L[r][g] is still constructible from a set, so by theorem 26, it follows that the bedrock
axiom fails in L[r][g]. So there is no generic bedrock, since a generic bedrock would
be a bedrock in some set-forcing extension. 
The argument of the previous proof can be expanded to show the following.
Theorem 58. If the universe is constructible from a set, then this is true through-
out the generic multiverse. If in addition the bedrock axiom fails, then it fails
throughout the generic multiverse.
Proof. We have to show that the properties in question are preserved when passing
to set-forcing extensions and to grounds. If the universe is constructible from a
set, then this is obviously true in forcing extensions. To see that it is true in
grounds as well, suppose that V = L[x] and W is a ground of V . Let P ∈ W be
a partial order for which G is generic, such that L[x] = W [G]. Let τ be a name
such that x = τG. Let a ∈ W be a set of ordinals which codes the transitive
closure t = TC({P, τ}), and consider the ZFC model L[a]. Notice that L[a] ⊆ W
since a ∈ W and L[a][G] = L[x], since x = τG ∈ L[a][G]. Moreover, G is L[a]-
generic, and so L[a] ⊆ W ⊆ L[a][G] traps the ZFC model W between L[a] and its
forcing extension L[a][G] = L[x], and so it follows by fact 11 that W is a set-forcing
extension of L[a], and hence constructible from a set.
Let’s now assume that the universe is constructible from a set and the bedrock
axiom fails. Clearly, the failure of the bedrock axiom is preserved when passing to
grounds, since a bedrock of a ground would be a bedrock, by fact 11. This holds in
general, without assuming that the universe is constructible from a set. The argu-
ment establishing corollary 57 shows that the failure of the bedrock axiom persists
from models which are constructible from a set to their set-forcing extensions. 
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Let us say that a model having no bedrock model is bottomless and a model
having no generic bedrock is generically bottomless.
We are of course interested more generally in the question of in what sense
the generic multiverse itself may be downward directed, downward set-directed
or locally downward set-directed. These questions are easy enough to formalize
directly in the toy model approach, but in the full context of forcing over V , the
questions can present meta-mathematical difficulties for the general case, although
they are also consequences of other axioms, such as the solid generic bedrock axiom,
which are formalizable. At least part of the interest in such questions, of course,
has to do with their relation to the following question.
Question 59. Does the generic mantle necessarily satisfy ZFC?
Although we have introduced the mantle and the generic mantle as distinct
notions, as we mentioned earlier we do not actually know that they are different.
We have as yet no models in which the mantle differs from the generic mantle.
Question 60. Is it consistent with ZFC that the mantle is different from the generic
mantle?
At the end of the next section, we shall see that all the previous questions have
simple answers if the universe is constructible from a set.
4. The generic HOD
Let us now introduce the generic HOD, a concept generalizing the classical HOD
in the same way that the generic mantle generalizes the mantle. We assume that
the reader is familiar with the basic theory of HOD, the class of hereditarily ordinal
definable sets (consult [Jec03] for a review).
Definition 61. The generic HOD of V , denoted gHOD, is the intersection of all
the HODs of all set-forcing extensions of V . That is, x ∈ gHOD if and only if
x ∈ HODV [G] for all set-forcing extensions V [G]. So
gHOD = {x | ∀P 1 P xˇ ∈ HOD}.
The generic HOD has been referred to as the limit HOD, or limω HOD when
it was introduced in [Fuc08, p. 298] as a special case of limκHOD. The following
characterization was used there.
Lemma 62. gHOD = {x | ∀α Coll(ω,α) xˇ ∈ HOD} =
⋂
α<OrdHOD
V Coll(ω,α) .
Proof. Only the first identity needs a proof. The inclusion from left to right is
trivial. For the opposite direction, let x be in HODV
Coll(ω,α)
, for every α. Let P be
an arbitrary poset, and let α be at least the cardinality of P. Then P× Coll(ω, α)
embeds densely into Coll(ω, α). Let G ×H be P × Coll(ω, α)-generic over V , and
let H ′ be Coll(ω, α)-generic over V such that V [G][H ] = V [H ′]. Then it follows
from the homogeneity of Coll(ω, α), and from the fact that Coll(ω, α) is ordinal
definable, that
x ∈ HODV [H
′] = HODV [G][H] ⊆ HODV [G].
So P forces that x ∈ HOD, and as P was arbitrary, it follows that x ∈ gHOD, as
desired. 
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The proof of the previous lemma also shows that if α ≤ β, then HODV
Coll(ω,β)
⊆
HODV
Coll(ω,α)
, as we had noted in theorem 20.
Theorem 63 ([Fuc08]). In any model of set theory, gHOD is a parameter-free uni-
formly first-order definable class, containing all ordinals, invariant by set forcing,
and a model of ZFC.
Proof. The standard treatments of HOD show that the relation x ∈ HOD is
parameter-free uniformly first-order definable in any model of set theory. So defi-
nition 61 is a definition of gHOD which has the desired form. It is easy to see that
gHOD is transitive and that it contains all ordinals.
To see that it is invariant by forcing, consider any set-forcing extension V ⊆ V [G]
by a poset P. If α is at least the cardinality of P and H is Coll(ω, α)-generic over
V [G], then there is an H ′ which is Coll(ω, α)-generic over V such that V [H ′] =
V [G][H ]. So (HODV
Coll(ω,α)
)V [G] = HODV [G][H] = HODV [H
′] = HODV
Coll(ω,α)
. So
by the remark after lemma 62, it follows that
gHODV [G] =
( ⋂
|P|≤β
HODV
Coll(ω,β))V [G]
=
⋂
|P|≤β
HODV
Coll(ω,β)
= gHOD.
It follows immediately from corollary 24 that gHOD |= ZFC, as it is the inter-
section of the definable decreasing sequence 〈HODV
Coll(ω,α)
| α < Ord〉 of ZFC-
models. 
Corollary 64. The generic HOD is constant across the generic multiverse and is
contained in the generic mantle. The classes exhibit the following inclusions:
HOD
⊆
gHOD ⊆ gM ⊆ M
Proof. Because theorem 63 shows that gHOD is invariant by forcing, every model
in the multiverse has the same gHOD. Thus, gHOD is contained within the inter-
section of the multiverse, which is the generic mantle, and so gHOD ⊆ gM. The
other inclusions gHOD ⊆ HOD and gM ⊆ M are immediate. 
These basic inclusion relations will be separated by the theorems of the next
section, except that the exact nature of the generic mantle remains somewhat un-
settled, since we have been unable to separate it either from the generic HOD or
from the mantle, although we do separate these latter two. Before moving on to
those results, however, let us first prove the following theorem, which explains in
part why proper class forcing will loom so large in our subsequent arguments.
Theorem 65. If the universe is constructible from a set, V = L[a], then
gHOD = gM = M.
Proof. We know already that gHOD ⊆ gM ⊆ M, by corollary 64, so the only thing
left to prove is that M ⊆ gHOD. But this follows immediately from theorem 20,
which states among other things that the inner models of the form HODV
Coll(ω,α)
are dense in the grounds, together with lemma 62, which says that the generic HOD
is the intersection of these models. 
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5. Controlling the mantle and the generic mantle
We now prove our main theorems, which control the mantle and generic mantle
of the target models, and also the HOD and generic HOD.
Theorem 66. Every model V of ZFC has a class forcing extension V [G] in which
V is the mantle, the generic mantle, the generic HOD and the HOD.
V = MV [G] = gMV [G] = gHODV [G] = HODV [G]
Proof. Our strategy will be to perform class forcing V ⊆ V [G] in such a way that
the various forces acting on the mantles and HODs in V [G] are perfectly balanced,
in each case giving V as the result. Pushing upward, expanding these classes up
to V , we will force in such a way that every set in V is coded explicitly into the
continuum function of V [G], thereby ensuring that each such set is in the mantle, the
generic mantle, the HOD and the generic HOD. Pressing downward, holding these
classes down to V , we will maintain certain factor and homogeneity properties on
the forcing that ensure that no additional sets are added to the mantles and HODs.
For each ordinal α, let δα be the α
th cardinal of the form λ+, where λ is a
strong limit cardinal, but not a limit of strong limit cardinals. More precisely,
δα = i
+
ω·(α+1), the successor of λ = iω·(α+1). The δα will be the cardinals at
which we code information, one bit each time, by forcing either the GCH or its
failure at δα. Every δα is a regular uncountable cardinal, and the sequence of δα
is increasing, conveniently spaced apart in order to avoid interference between the
various levels of coding. We could easily modify the argument to allow the δα to be
spaced more closely together—and if the GCH holds in V , we could actually code
at every successor cardinal—but spacing the cardinals more distantly as we have
seems to produce the most transparent general argument. Since λ is not a limit
of strong limit cardinals, there is a largest strong limit cardinal γ below λ, namely
γ = iω·α, and furthermore, δβ ≤ γ
+ for all β < α. Note also that α ≤ iω·α = γ,
and so α < γ+ < λ < δα. Let Qα be the forcing that generically chooses whether
to force the GCH or its negation at δα. To force the GCH at δα, we use the forcing
Add(δ+α , 1) to add a Cohen subset to δ
+
α , which is equivalent to the canonical forcing
to collapse 2δα to δ+α . Forcing the failure of the GCH at δα, on the other hand,
requires a little care in the case that the GCH fails below δα in V , for adding
generic subsets to δα may collapse cardinals above δα, and even adding (δ
++
α )
V
many subsets to δα may not in general suffice to ensure that the GCH fails at δα in
the extension. Since the standard ∆-system argument (see [Kun80, Lemma 6.10])
establishes that Add(δα, θ) is (2
<δα)+-c.c. for any ordinal θ, however, it does in
general suffice to add ((2<δα)++)V many subsets to δα. Thus, we take Qα as the
side-by-side forcing of these two alternatives, or in the terminology of [Ham00], the
poset Qα is the lottery sum Add(δ
+
α , 1) ⊕ Add(δα, (2
<δα)++).4 Conditions opting
for the first poset force the GCH at δα and those opting for the second force its
failure. Note that Qα is <δα-closed and has size (2
<δα)++, which is strictly less
than the next strong limit above δα, which is itself less than δα+1.
Let P be the class forcing product P =
∏
αQα, with set support. That is,
conditions in P are set functions p, with dom(p) ⊆ Ord and p(α) ∈ Qα, ordered
4More generally, for any family A of forcing notions, the lottery sum ⊕A is defined to be
{ (P, p) | p ∈ P ∈ A}∪{1}, ordered with 1 above everything and otherwise (P, p) ≤ (Q, q)↔ P = Q
and p ≤P q. The generic filter must in effect choose a single P ∈ A and force with it. For two
posets, we use infix notation: P⊕ Q = ⊕{P,Q}.
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by extension of the domain and strengthening in each coordinate. (In particular,
we do not use Easton support, which would not work here, because it would create
new unwanted definable subsets of the inaccessible cardinals, if any.) Suppose that
G ⊆ P is V -generic and consider the model V [G]. The class forcing P factors at
every ordinal α as Pα × P
α, where Pα =
∏
α′<αQα′ and P
α =
∏
α′≥αQα′ , where
again the products have set support, which for Pα means full support. We claim
that |Pα| < δα for every α. To see this, suppose that δα = λ
+, where λ is a
strong limit cardinal, but not a limit of strong limit cardinals. We have argued
that δβ ≤ γ
+ for every β < α, where γ is the largest strong limit cardinal below λ.
It follows that |Qβ | ≤ (2
<γ+)++, and so Pα is the product of α many posets of at
most this size. Since α ≤ γ+, this implies that Pα has size at most ((2
<γ+)++)γ
+
,
and since λ is a strong limit cardinal, this is less than λ and hence less than δα,
as desired. Combining this with the fact that the tail forcing Pα is <δα-closed, it
follows that every set in V [G] is added by some large enough initial factor Pα. And
using this, the standard arguments show that V [G] satisfies ZFC. (For example, in
the terminology of [Rei06], this is a progressively closed product, and these always
preserve ZFC.)
Let us verify that indeed the various levels of GCH coding in our forcing do not
interfere with each other. For any ordinal α, factor P as Pα × Qα × P
α+1. The
tail forcing Pα+1 is <δα+1-closed and therefore does not affect the GCH at δα. The
initial factor Pα has size less than δα, and therefore does not affect the GCH at
δα. So the question whether the GCH holds at δα in V [G] is determined by what
G does on Qα. In other words, the overall GCH pattern in V [G] on the cardinals
δα is determined in accordance with the choices that G makes in the individual
lotteries at each coordinate. A similar argument shows that the forcing P preserves
all strong limit cardinals and creates no new strong limit cardinals. Thus, the class
{ δα | α ∈ Ord } remains definable in V [G].
Let us now make the key observations about V [G]. First, pushing upward, we
claim that every set of ordinals in V is coded into the GCH pattern of V [G]. Suppose
that x is a set of ordinals in V and p is any condition in P. Choose ordinals β and
ξ with x ⊆ β and dom(p) ⊆ ξ. Since x is a set and P uses set support, we may
extend p to a stronger condition q ≤ p with dom(q) = dom(p) ∪ [ξ, ξ + β), where
q opts on the interval [ξ, ξ + β) to force the GCH or its negation according to the
pattern determined by x. That is, we build q so that for every α < β, if α ∈ x, then
q(ξ + α) opts to force the GCH at δξ+α, and if α /∈ x, then it opts for its failure.
Since we have argued that there is no interference between the levels of coding, the
condition q forces that the GCH pattern in V [G] for those values of δξ+α is exactly
the same as the pattern of x on β. Thus, it is dense that x is coded in this way,
and so generically every set in V will be coded into the GCH pattern of V [G], since
every set in V is coded by a set of ordinals in V . Since we have mentioned that
the class { δα | α ∈ Ord } is definable in V [G], we may conclude immediately that
every set in V is ordinal definable in V [G]. For the generic HOD, we consider the
set-forcing extensions of V [G]. Suppose that V [G][h] is obtained by further forcing
h ⊆ Q ∈ V [G]. Since the continuum function of V [G][h] and V [G] agree above
|Q|, it follows that V [G] and V [G][h] have the same strong limit cardinals and the
same GCH patterns above |Q|. This implies that a tail segment of { δα | α ∈ Ord }
remains definable in V [G][h], and the GCH pattern on this segment is the same in
V [G][h] as in V [G]. Since every set of ordinals x in V was coded into the the GCH
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pattern of V [G] on the cardinals { δα | α ∈ Ord }, a simple padding argument shows
that this implies that every set in V is in fact coded unboundedly often into the
GCH pattern of V [G] on these cardinals. So we conclude that every set in V remains
ordinal definable in the extension V [G][h]. Since the forcing h was arbitrary, we
conclude V ⊆ gHODV [G], and consequently also V ⊆ gHOD ⊆ gM ⊆M.
Conversely, we now argue that the mantle M of V [G] is contained in V . For any
ordinal α, factor the forcing at α as P = Pα × P
α. The generic filter G similarly
factors as Gα ×G
α. Since Pα is set forcing in V , it follows that the tail extension
V [Gα] is a ground of V [G], and so the mantle of V [G] is contained within every
V [Gα]. Since Pα is <δα-closed, it follows in particular that V
V [Gα]
α = Vα, and
so
⋂
α V [G
α] = V . Altogether, we have established V ⊆ gHOD ⊆ gM ⊆ M ⊆
V , and so all these are equal, as we claimed. Finally, let us consider HODV [G].
We have argued that V ⊆ HODV [G], and it remains for us to prove the converse
inclusion. For this, in order to control HODV [G], it would be expected to appeal to
homogeneity properties of the forcing P. Unfortunately, the forcing P is not weakly
homogeneous, because different conditions can make fundamentally different choices
in the lotteries about how the forcing will proceed. Nevertheless, we claim that
there is sufficient latent homogeneity in the forcing for an argument to succeed.
In order to show HODV [G] ⊆ V , it suffices to show that HODV [G] is contained
in every tail extension V [Gα], as the intersection over these is V , as we argued.
Consider V [G] as a forcing extension of the tail extension V [Gα] by the initial
forcing Gα ⊆ Pα. Although Pα is not weakly homogenous, it is densely weakly
homogeneous, meaning that there is a dense set of conditions q such that the lower
cone Pα ↾ q is weakly homogeneous. The point is simply that because we have
used full support, rather than Easton support, we may extend any condition in Pα
to a condition with support α. Furthermore, we may extend to a condition that
makes a definite selection in each of the lotteries before stage α as to which of
the two posets should be used in that coordinate. Since each of these individual
posets is weakly homogenous, the lower cone Pα ↾ q is the full product of weakly
homogeneous forcing, and consequently is itself weakly homogeneous. Thus, by
genericity, there is some q ∈ Gα such that Pα ↾ q is weakly homogenous. It follows
that every ordinal definable set of ordinals added by this forcing is definable in
the ground model V [Gα] from ordinal parameters and the poset Pα ↾ q, used as
an additional parameter. So we have proved that HODV [G] is included in every
tail extension V [Gα], and thus in V . So we have proved all the desired equalities
V = MV [G] = gMV [G] = gHODV [G] = HODV [G]. 
Theorem 67. Every model V of ZFC has a class forcing extension V [G] in which
V is the mantle, the generic mantle and the generic HOD, but V [G] is the HOD.
V = MV [G] = gMV [G] = gHODV [G], but HODV [G] = V [G].
Proof. For this theorem, we must balance the various forces on the classes differ-
ently, to keep the mantles and the generic HOD low, while allowing HODV [G] to
expand. Pushing the classes up at least to V , our strategy will be once again to
force that every set of ordinals in V is coded unboundedly into the continuum func-
tion of V [G]. In order to push HODV [G] fully up to V [G], however, we will force
that every new set of ordinals in V [G] is coded into the continuum function, but
these new sets will be coded each time only boundedly often. This makes these
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sets ordinal definable in V [G], while allowing the factor argument of theorem 66 to
hold down the mantle to V and consequently also the generic mantle and generic
HOD. The subtle effect is that the new sets become ordinal definable, but only
temporarily so, for further forcing can erase the bounded coding and make them
drop out of HOD.
The essential component, for any regular cardinal κ, is the self-encoding forcing
at κ, which we now describe. This is the forcing iteration Q of length ω that begins
by adding a Cohen subset of κ, and then proceeds in each subsequent stage to code
the generic filter from the prior stage into the GCH pattern at the next block of
cardinals. All coding will take place in the interval I = [κ, λ), where λ = iλ is the
least beth fixed point above κ (and the forcing will preserve all beth fixed points).
The end result in the corresponding extension V [G] is that the initial Cohen subset
of κ and the entire generic filter G is coded into the GCH pattern at cardinals in
I. To be more precise, the forcing begins at stage 0 with Q0 = Add(κ, 1), adding
a Cohen subset g0 ⊆ κ0 = κ. The stage 1 forcing Q˙1 will code g0 into the GCH
pattern at the next κ many cardinals. For this, we first force if necessary to ensure
that the GCH holds at the next κ many cardinals (this may collapse cardinals,
but there is no need to exceed or even reach the beth fixed point λ = iλ), and
then perform suitable Easton forcing at these cardinals, so that for the next κ many
cardinals ν above κ in the corresponding extension V [g0∗g1], we have either 2
ν = ν+
or 2ν = ν++, according to whether the corresponding ordinal is in g0. In order to
continue the iteration, we use a canonical pairing function on ordinals in order to
view g1 as a subset of κ1, the supremum of the next κ many surviving cardinals
above κ. In general, the generic filter for the stage n forcing Qn is determined by a
subset gn ⊆ κn, and the stage n+ 1 forcing Q˙n+1 first forces if necessary the GCH
to hold at the next κn many cardinals, and then uses Easton forcing to code gn
into the GCH pattern on those cardinals. There is sufficient room to carry out each
stage of forcing below the next beth fixed point λ = iλ, and it is not difficult to see
that λ = supn κn. The entire iteration Q consequently has size λ
ω. The end result
is that if G ⊆ Q is V -generic, then G is coded explicitly into the GCH pattern of
V [G] on the interval I. Note that Q is <κ-closed and does not affect the continuum
function on cardinals outside the interval I provided the GCH holds on I in V . In
the event that the GCH fails in V the situation is not much worse, as Q does not
affect the continuum function outside the interval (γ, λω) where 2γ ≤ κ.
We now assemble these components into the overall class forcing. For every
ordinal α, let κα be the α
th cardinal of the form (2λ)+, where λ = iλ is a beth
fixed point. Let Qα be the self-encoding forcing at κα, which adds a generic filter
that encodes itself into the GCH pattern on the interval Iα = [κα, λα), where λα
is the next beth fixed point above κα. Note that these intervals are disjoint. Let
P =
∏
αQα be the set-support class product of these posets. As in theorem 66, we
may for any ordinal α factor this forcing as Pα × P
α, where Pα =
∏
β<αQβ and
Pα =
∏
β≥αQβ , using again set support in these products, which for Pα means full
support. The initial factor Pα is the product of posets Qβ of size λ
ω
β , for β < α,
which therefore has size at most λα ≤ 2λ, where λ = supβ<α λβ . This is strictly
less than κα. In summary, we have established the convenient factor properties
that |Pα| < κα and P
α is <κα-closed. The usual arguments now show that if G ⊆ P
is V -generic, then V [G] satisfies ZFC and every set in V [G] is added by some stage
V [Gα]. Also, for any ordinal α, we may factor the forcing as Pα × Qα × P
α+1.
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Because the final factor Pα+1 is <κα+1-closed and the initial factor Pα has size less
than κα, neither of these affects the GCH pattern on the interval Iα = [κα, λα).
Thus, the GCH pattern on Iα in V [G] is determined by what the generic filter G
does on the αth coordinate Qα.
We now observe that V [G] exhibits the desired coding features. If x is any set
of ordinals in V , then in any coordinate stage α of forcing above sup(x), it is dense
for x to appear as an interval in the generic object added at the very first stage
of forcing in Qα. The subsequent stages of forcing in Qα will therefore have the
effect of coding x into the GCH pattern in Iα. Thus, the set x is coded into the
GCH pattern of V [G], and is consequently ordinal definable there. Since x is coded
unboundedly often in this way, x will remain ordinal definable in any set-forcing
extension of V [G], because any such extension V [G][h] has the same GCH pattern
as V [G] above the size of the forcing h. Thus, x is ordinal definable in any such
V [G][h], and so V ⊆ gHODV [G]. We know in general that gHOD ⊆ gM ⊆ M. In
order to complete the cycle, we now argue M ⊆ V . Observe that the tail forcing
extension V [Gα] is a ground of V [G], because the initial factor Pα is set forcing.
Thus, the mantle of V [G] is contained within the intersection of all V [Gα]. But
as before, the intersection of all of the tail extensions V [Gα] is simply V , by the
increasing closedness of Pα, and so the mantle of V [G] is contained in V . This
establishes that V ⊆ gHODV [G] ⊆ gMV [G] ⊆ MV [G] ⊆ V , and hence all are equal,
as desired.
It remains to compute HODV [G]. We have observed that every set in V [G] is
added by some initial factor forcing Pα for some ordinal α, and therefore every
object in V [G] has the form τGα , for some ordinal α and some Pα-name τ in V .
Since we have already established that V ⊆ HODV [G], it follows that the name
τ is ordinal definable in V [G]. Furthermore, for every β < α, the generic filter
G(β) ⊆ Qβ added at stage β is coded into the continuum function on the interval
Iβ , and in V [G] we may definably assemble these filters into the generic filter Gα
on the product Pα =
∏
β<αQβ. Thus, Gα is also ordinal definable in V [G]. So τGα
is ordinal definable in V [G] and so HODV [G] = V [G], as desired. 
In the previous theorem, we have kept the mantles low, while pushing up the
HOD. Next, in contrast, we keep the HODs low, while pushing up the mantle.
Theorem 68. The constructible universe L has a class-forcing extension L[G] in
which L is the HOD and generic HOD, but L[G] is the mantle.
L = HODL[G] = gHODL[G], but ML[G] = L[G].
Proof. This theorem is a consequence of the main result of [HRW08]. In that article,
Hamkins, Reitz and Woodin showed that if one performs the Easton-support Silver
iteration over L, successively adding a Cohen subset to each regular cardinal, then
the resulting model L[G] satisfies the ground axiom. In other words, L[G] has no
nontrivial grounds, and therefore is its own mantle. Since the forcing is weakly
homogeneous and ordinal-definable, it creates no new ordinal-definable sets, and so
HODL[G] = L. Since gHOD ⊆ HOD, it follows that gHODL[G] = L as well. 
Unfortunately, we have not yet managed to determine the generic mantle of L[G].
Question 69. What is the generic mantle of the Hamkins-Reitz-Woodin model
L[G]?
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Let us now prove a generalized version of theorem 68.
Theorem 70. Every model V of ZFC has a class forcing extension V [G] in which
V is the HOD and generic HOD, but V [G] is the mantle.
V = HODV [G] = gHODV [G], but MV [G] = V [G].
Proof. For this theorem, we adapt the main argument and result of [HRW08]. The
forcing takes place in two steps. First, we perform the forcing of theorem 66, coding
into the GCH pattern on the cardinals δα = i
+
ω·α+ω. This forcing, the reader will
recall, is the set-support product
∏
αQα, where Qα generically chooses whether to
force the GCH at δα or its failure. If V [H ] is the resulting forcing extension, then
the argument of theorem 66 shows that V = HODV [H] = gHODV [H] = MV [H] =
gMV [H].
The second step is to perform an Easton-support Silver iteration P over V [H ], a
class length forcing iteration that at stage α adds a Cohen subset to (2δα)+. These
cardinals lay conveniently within the interval (δα, δα+1) between the successive
coding points of the first step. Suppose thatK ⊆ P is V [H ]-generic, and we consider
the final extension V [H ][K]. Because the Silver iteration does not affect the GCH
coding at the various δα and preserves all strong limit cardinals and therefore the
definability of the class { δα | α ∈ Ord }, it follows that every set in V is coded
arbitrarily highly in the continuum function of V [H ∗ K]. This coding survives
into set generic extensions of V [H ∗K] and their HODs, and so V ⊆ gHODV [H∗K].
Conversely, the Silver iteration P is weakly homogeneous and ordinal definable, and
so HODV [H∗K] ⊆ HODV [H] = V . We conclude V = HODV [H∗K] = gHODV [H∗K].
We claim now V [H ∗ K] has no nontrivial grounds, and is therefore its own
mantle. In other words, V [H ∗ K] satisfies the ground axiom. This part of the
argument follows the main method and result of [HRW08]. Let us suppose towards
a contradiction that W is a nontrivial ground, so that V [H ∗K] = W [h] for some
nontrivial forcing h ⊆ Q ∈ W over W . We may assume that conditions in Q
are ordinals less than |Q|W . Since this is set forcing, the model W has the same
continuum function as W [h] on cardinals above |Q|W . In particular, these models
eventually have the same strong limit cardinals, and so a final segment of the class
{ δα | α ∈ Ord } is definable in W . Because the sets of ordinals in V are all coded
unboundedly often into the GCH pattern of V [H ∗K] = W [h] on these cardinals,
it follows that they are also coded in W and so V ⊆ W . Let λ be the least strong
limit above |Q|W , so that λ+ = δα for some ordinal α. Factor both forcing notions
at α, resulting in V [H ∗ K] = V [H1][H2][K1][K2], where H1 is the part of H at
coordinates β < α and H2 is the part of H at coordinates β ≥ α, and K1 ⊆ Pα is
the part of K below stage α and K2 ⊆ Pα,∞ is the tail part of the K iteration from
stage α onwards. Thus, we have V [H1][H2][K1][K2] =W [h]. Note that the forcing
adding H1 and K1 has size strictly less than λ. Let δ be a regular cardinal above
the size of these initial factors and also |Q|W , but less than λ. Since the forcing
that adds H2 is <δ-closed in V , every δ-small subset of H2 in V [H ][K] is covered
by a condition in V . To see this, let x ⊆ H2 have size less than δ in V [H ][K]. By
the closedness of the last factor, x ∈ V [H ][K1] = V [H2][H1][K1]. Since H1 ∗ K1
is generic for forcing of size less than δ in V [H2], we can conclude by the δ-cover
property (see lemma 8) that there is x′ ∈ V [H2] such that x ⊆ x
′ and x′ has size
less than δ in V [H2]. Since H2 is a class in V [H2], we may pick x
′ in such a way
that x′ ⊆ H2. Now it follows by the <δ-closedness of P2 in V that x
′ ∈ V . And
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by genericity of H2, there is a common strengthening of all the conditions in x
′ in
V . Let’s call it a master condition for x. Since V ⊆ W , such conditions are also
in W . Thus, every δ-small approximation H2 ∩ B to H2, with B ∈ W of size less
than δ in W , will be the set of conditions in B which are weaker than a master
condition for H2 ∩B, and will therefore itself be in W . Since the forcing adding h
over W is small relative to δ and therefore exhibits the δ-approximation property
by lemma 8, it follows that H2 is amenable to W , and hence that V [H2] ⊆ W . In
W , let A ⊆ λ code (2<λ)W , as well as Q-names H˙1, K˙1 ∈W such that H1 = (H˙1)h
and K1 = (K˙1)h; for example, we could simply ensure that H
W
λ ∈ L[A]. Since
A ∈ W , it follows that V [H2][A] ⊆ W . Since A codes all bounded subsets of λ
in W , we have Q ∈ V [H2][A]. The filter h is V [H2][A]-generic for Q, and we may
consider the forcing extension V [H2][A][h]. By the choice of A, this model has the
names H˙1 and K˙1, allowing it to build H1 and K1 using h, and so V [H ][K1] ⊆
V [H2][A][h]. Conversely, the objects A and h could not have been added by the
tail forcing K2 over V [H ][K1], since this forcing is ≤λ-closed over V [H ][K1], and
so V [H2][A][h] ⊆ V [H ][K1]. Consequently, V [H2][A][h] = V [H ][K1]. We may
therefore view the model V [H∗K] as having arisen by forcing over V [H2][A], adding
h ∗ K2, since V [H2][A][h ∗ K2] = V [H2][A][h][K2] = V [H ][K1][K2] = V [H ∗ K].
Alternatively, we may view V [H ∗ K] = W [h] as having arisen by forcing over
W , adding h. Each of these extensions exhibits the δ-approximation and cover
properties. Furthermore, since P (δ)W = P (δ)V [H2][A] and the cardinal successor
of δ is the same in each of the models at hand, it follows by lemma 9 that W =
V [H2][A]. Thus, W [h] = V [H2][A][h], which we already established was V [H ][K1],
contrary to our assumption that W [h] = V [H ][K]. So there can be no such ground
W . 
Theorem 71. Every model V of ZFC has a class forcing extension V [G] in which
V [G] is its own mantle, generic mantle, generic HOD and HOD.
V [G] = MV [G] = gMV [G] = gHODV [G] = HODV [G]
Proof. The main result of [Rei06], using ideas of [McA71], shows that every model
V of ZFC has a class forcing extension V [G] in which every set of ordinals is coded
unboundedly often into the continuum function. (This assertion was called the
continuum coding axiom.) In this case, it is easy to see that V [G] = MV [G] =
gMV [G] = gHODV [G] = HODV [G], since these sets remains coded in this way in all
set-forcing extensions and grounds of such extensions by set forcing. 
Remark 72. We have chosen to use GCH coding in the arguments above. However,
the arguments are easily modified to accommodate other methods of coding, which
would be consistent with GCH in the target model. For example, coding via ♦∗κ,
in the style of [BT07, BT09], seems perfectly acceptable. The result would be that
one could add V [G] |= GCH to each of theorems 66, 67, 70, and 71.
6. Inner mantles and the outer core
The mantle M of the universe V arises by brushing away the outermost layers
of forcing like so much accumulated dust and sand to reveal the underlying ancient
structure, the mantle, on which these layers rest. If the mantle is itself a model of
ZFC, then it makes sense to penetrate still deeper, computing the mantle of the
mantle and so on, revealing still more ancient layers, and one naturally desires to
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iterate the process. We begin easily enough with M0 = V and then recursively
define the successive inner mantles by Mn+1 = MM
n
, that is, Mn+1 is the mantle
of Mn, provided that this is a model of ZFC. Thus, M1 is the mantle and M2
is the mantle of the mantle, and so on. One would naturally expect to continue
this recursion transfinitely with an intersection Mω =
⋂
n<ωM
n at ω, but here
an interesting and subtle metamathematical obstacle rises up, preventing a simple
success. The issue is that although we have provided definitions of the mantle M1
and of the mantle-of-the-mantle M2 and so on, these definitions become increasingly
complex as the procedure is iterated, and an observant reader will notice that our
recursive definition does not actually provide a definition of the nth mantle Mn that
is uniform in n. Instead, it is a recursion that takes place in the meta-theory rather
than the object theory, and so on this definition we may legitimately refer to the
nth mantle Mn only for meta-theoretic natural numbers n. In particular, it does
not provide a uniform definition of the inner mantles Mn, and consequently with it
we seem unable to perform the intersection
⋂
nM
n in a definable manner.
Exactly the same issue arises when one attempts to iterate the class HOD, by
considering the HOD-of-HOD and so on in the iterated HODn models. A 1974
result of Harrington appearing in [Zad83, section 7], with related work in [McA74],
shows that it is relatively consistent with Go¨del-Bernays set theory that HODn
exists for each n < ω but the intersection HODω =
⋂
nHOD
n is not a class. There
simply is in general no uniform definition of the classes HODn. We expect an
analogous result for the iterated mantles Mn, and this is a current focus of study
for us.
Nevertheless, some models of set theory have a special structure that allows
them to enjoy a uniform definition of these classes, and in these models we may
continue the iteration transfinitely. Following the treatment of the iterated HODα
and gHODα of [HKP12], and working in Go¨del-Bernays set theory, we define that
a GB class M¯ is a uniform presentation of the inner mantles Mα for α < η if
M¯ ⊆ { (x, α) | α < η } and the slices M¯α = { x | (x, α) ∈ M¯ } for α < η are all inner
models of ZFC and obey the defining properties of the iterated mantle construction,
namely, the base case M¯0 = V , the successor case M¯α+1 = MM¯
α
and the limit
case M¯γ =
⋂
α<γ M¯
α for limit ordinals γ. By induction, any two such classes M¯
agree on their common coordinates, and when such a class M¯ has been provided we
may legitimately and unambiguously refer to the αth mantle Mα. We accordingly
define the phrase “the ηth inner mantle Mη exists” to mean that η is an ordinal and
there is a uniform presentation M¯ of the inner mantles Mα for α ≤ η. It is easy to
see that the nth inner mantle Mn exists for any (meta-theoretic) natural number
n, and if Mη exists, so does Mα for any α < η. But as with the Harrington result
in the case of HODα, we do not expect necessarily to be able to proceed through
limit ordinals or even up to ω uniformly. Note that even when the ηth inner mantle
Mη exists, there seems little reason to expect that it is necessarily a definable class,
even when η is definable or comparatively small, such as η = ω.
Question 73. Is there is a model of GBC in which there is no uniform presentation
of the inner mantles Mn for n < ω? In particular, is there a model where the ωth
inner mantle Mω does not exist? Is there a model where Mω exists as a class but
does not satisfy ZFC?
In analogy with the situation with the iterated HODs, we expect affirmative
answers to these questions.
SET-THEORETIC GEOLOGY 39
In the case that there is a uniform presentation of the inner mantles Mα for all
ordinals α, that is, presented uniformly by a single GB class M¯ ⊆ V × Ord, then
it follows by corollary 24 that MOrd =
⋂
αM
α |= ZFC as well. That is, if one can
iteratively and uniformly compute the inner mantles all the way through Ord, then
the intersection MOrd of these inner mantles is a ZFC model, and we may continue
past Ord by defining MOrd+1 = MM
Ord
, and so on.
One way that this might happen, of course, is if the inner mantle process actually
stabilizes before Ord, that is, if for some α we have Mα = Mβ for all β > α; in this
case, Mα is a model of ZFC, but not a nontrivial forcing extension of any deeper
model (or equivalently, a model of ZFC plus the ground axiom). If α is minimal
with this property, then we say that the sequence of inner mantles stabilizes at α and
refer to the model Mα as the outer core of the universe in which it was computed.
This is what remains when all outer layers of forcing have been successively stripped
away. There seems to be no reason in general why the inner mantle process should
necessarily stabilize at an early stage, or even after iterating through all the ordinals.
For example, there seems to be no obvious reason why MOrd cannot itself be a
forcing extension of some other still-deeper model. Indeed, we make the following
strong negative conjecture about this prospect.
Conjecture 74. Every model of ZFC is the MOrd of another model of ZFC in
which the sequence of inner mantles does not stabilize. More generally, every model
of ZFC is the Mα of another model of ZFC for any desired α ≤ Ord, in which the
sequence of inner mantles does not stabilize before α.
Let us explain the sense in which this conjecture, along with the main theorem of
this article, can be viewed as philosophically negative. If one has adopted the philo-
sophical view that beneath the set-theoretic universe lies a highly regular structure,
some kind of canonical inner model, which may have become obscured over the eons
by the accumulated layers of subsequent forcing constructions over that structure,
then one would be led to expect that the mantle, or perhaps the inner mantles
or the outer core, which sweep away all these subsequent layers of forcing, would
exhibit highly regular structural features. But since our main theorem shows that
every model of ZFC is the mantle of another model, one cannot prove in general
that the mantle exhibits any extra structural features at all. And under conjecture
74, the same can be said of the inner mantles and the outer core. In particular,
if the conjecture holds, then there are models whose outer core is realized first at
stage α in Mα, for any desired α ≤ Ord, since every model of ZFC + GA would
be the (Mα)V of a suitable extension V . Thus, under the conjecture one should
not expect to prove universal regularity features for the outer core even when it is
realized as MOrd, beyond what one can prove about arbitrary models of the ground
axiom. And this is not much, since [HRW08] shows that models of GA need not
even satisfy V = HOD.
Note that if the conjecture holds, then the inner mantle MOrd can be itself
a forcing extension (since many models of ZFC are forcing extensions), and the
process of stripping away the outer layers of forcing has not terminated even with
Ord many iterations. Thus, the conjecture implies that there can be models of set
theory having no outer core. It is also conceivable that the inner mantle calculation
might break down at some ordinal stage α for the reason that Mα no longer satisfies
ZFC, and in this case, the original model would have no outer core.
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Question 75. Under what circumstances does the outer core exist?
We may similarly carry out the entire construction using generic mantles in
place of mantles. Thus, we define that “the ηth inner generic mantle gMη exists,”
for η ≤ Ord, if there is a class M¯ ⊆ V × η, whose slices are inner models of ZFC
respecting the iterative definition of the generic mantle, so that M¯0 = V at the
beginning, M¯α+1 = gMM¯
α
as successor ordinals, and M¯λ =
⋂
α<λ M¯
α at limits. If
the process terminates by reaching a model of ZFC that is equal to its own generic
mantle—thereby satisfying V = gMV , the generic ground axiom—then we refer to
this model as the generic outer core. One may similarly consider the iterated inner
HOD construction and inner generic HODs, as in [HKP12]. We extend conjecture 74
naturally to the following.
Conjecture 76. If V is any model of ZFC, then for any α ≤ Ord, there is another
model V of ZFC in which V is the αth inner mantle, the αth generic inner mantle,
the αth inner HOD and the αth inner generic HOD.
V = (Mα)V = (gMα)V = (HODα)V = (gHODα)V
7. Large cardinal indestructibility across the multiverse
Laver [Lav78] famously proved that any supercompact cardinal κ can be made
indestructible by further <κ-directed closed forcing. In this section, we consider
the possibility of large cardinal indestructibility not just in the upwards direction,
but throughout the relevant portion of the generic multiverse.
For any class Γ of forcing notions, we say that W is a Γ-ground of V , or equiva-
lently, that V is a Γ-extension of W , if V =W [G] for some W -generic G ⊆ P ∈W ,
where P has property Γ in W . The Γ-generic multiverse is obtained by closing the
universe under Γ-extensions and Γ-grounds.
Theorem 77. If κ is supercompact, then there is a class forcing extension V [G]
in which κ remains supercompact, becomes indestructible by further <κ-directed
closed forcing, and the ground axiom holds. Thus, κ remains supercompact in all
<κ-directed closed extensions and (vacuously) in all <κ-directed closed grounds.
Proof. Suppose that κ is supercompact. By Laver’s theorem [Lav78], we may find a
set-forcing extension V [g] in which κ remains supercompact and becomes indestruc-
tible by all <κ-directed closed forcing. By coding the universe into the continuum
function above κ, we may perform <κ-directed closed class forcing to find a model
V [g][G] in which every set is coded unboundedly often into the GCH pattern of
V [g][G]. It follows that V [g][G] satisfies the continuum coding axiom and therefore
also the ground axiom, as in [Rei07, Rei06]. Because the GCH coding forcing is
<κ-directed closed (and factors easily into set forcing followed by highly closed forc-
ing), it follows that the supercompactness of κ remains indestructible over V [g][G]
by further <κ-directed closed forcing. 
By combining the previous argument with the usual methods to attain global
indestructibility, one may also accomplish this effect for many supercompact car-
dinals simultaneously. We show next that it is not possible to improve this to the
entire <κ-directed closed generic multiverse.
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Theorem 78. No supercompact cardinal κ is indestructible throughout the <κ-
directed closed generic multiverse. Indeed, for every cardinal κ, there is a <κ-
directed closed generic ground in which κ is not measurable.
Proof. Fix any cardinal κ. Let P be the forcing to add a slim κ-Kurepa tree, a
tree T of height κ, whose αth level (for infinite α) has size at most |α|, but which
has κ+ many κ-branches. The natural way to do this has the feature that P is
<κ-closed, but not <κ-directed closed. An easy reflection argument shows that no
measurable cardinal can have a slim κ-Kurepa tree, and so κ is not measurable
in V [T ]. But the forcing P can be absorbed into the forcing Coll(κ, 2κ), since the
combined forcing P ∗ ˙Coll(κ, 2κ) is <κ-closed, has size 2κ and collapses 2κ to κ,
and Coll(κ, 2κ) is the unique forcing notion (up to isomorphism of the complete
Boolean algebras) with this property. Thus, if G ⊆ Coll(κ, 2κ) is V [T ]-generic for
this collapse, we may rearrange the combined generic filter T ∗ G as a single V -
generic filter H ⊆ Coll(κ, 2κ) such that V [T ][G] = V [H ]. Since the collapse forcing
is <κ-directed closed, it follows that V [T ] is a <κ-directed closed generic ground of
V , in which κ is not measurable, as desired. 
The situation for indestructible weak compactness is somewhat more attractive.
Theorem 79. If κ is supercompact, then there is a set-forcing extension V [G]
in which κ is weakly compact and this is indestructible throughout the <κ-closed
generic multiverse of V [G].
Proof. By the Laver preparation [Lav78], there is a forcing extension V [G] in
which the supercompactness of κ is indestructible by all <κ-directed closed forcing.
By [HJ10, Theorem 22], this implies that the weak compactness of κ is indestruc-
tible over V [G] by all <κ-closed forcing, that is, generalizing <κ-directed closed to
<κ-closed forcing.
Lemma 79.1. If κ is weakly compact and this is indestructible by <κ-closed forcing,
then κ retains this property throughout the <κ-closed generic multiverse.
Proof. Suppose that κ is weakly compact in a model V and indestructible over
V by all <κ-closed forcing. Clearly, this property remains true in all <κ-closed
extensions, since the two-step iteration of <κ-closed forcing is <κ-closed. We also
argue conversely, however, that the property remains true in all <κ-closed grounds.
Suppose that W is a <κ-closed ground of V , so that V = W [g] is W -generic for
some <κ-closed forcing g ⊆ P ∈ W . First, we know that κ is inaccessible in W
because inaccessibility is downward absolute. Second, in order to establish the tree
property for κ in W , suppose that T is a κ-tree in W . By the tree property of κ
in V , there is a branch b through T in V = W [g]. Thus, W has a P-name b˙ for
this branch. In W , since the forcing P is <κ-closed, we may build a pseudo-generic
descending κ-sequence of conditions in P that decide more and more of this name b˙.
Thus, in W we can build a branch through T , thereby establishing this instance of
the tree property for κ in W . It follows that κ is weakly compact in W . Consider
now any <κ-closed forcing Q ∈ W . Since P is <κ-closed in W , it follows that Q
remains <κ-closed in V =W [g]. Thus, for any W [g]-generic filter h ⊆ Q, it follows
by the indestructibility of κ over V that κ is weakly compact in V [h] = W [g][h].
Since P also remains <κ-closed in W [h], it follows by the pseudo-forcing downward
absoluteness argument that κ is weakly compact in W [h]. Thus, there can be no
condition in Q forcing over W that κ is not weakly compact in the extension of W
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by Q. Thus, we have proved that the weak compactness of κ is indestructible over
W by <κ-closed forcing. Thus, the indestructibility property we desire is preserved
as one moves through the <κ-closed generic multiverse. 
The theorem follows directly. 
In the case of small forcing, the well-known Le´vy-Solovay theorem of [LS67]
establishes that every measurable cardinal κ is preserved by the move to any κ-small
forcing extension as well as to any κ-small ground (that is, in each case, by forcing of
size less than κ). It follows that any measurable cardinal κ is measurable throughout
the corresponding small-generic multiverse. Similarly, most of the other classical
large cardinals are preserved to small forcing extensions and grounds, and therefore
retain their large cardinal property throughout the small-generic multiverse. It is
natural to consider also the extent to which other set-theoretic axioms, such as
the proper forcing axiom, are indestructible throughout significant portions of the
generic multiverse. For example, PFA is known to be indestructible to <ℵ2-directed
closed forcing extensions. Is it also necessarily preserved to all <ℵ2-directed closed
ground models? Of course, this situation is at least relatively consistent, since we
may make it a vacuous claim, as in theorem 77, by forcing the CCA over any model
of PFA via <ℵ2-directed closed forcing, resulting in a model of ZFC + PFA+ GA,
which has no nontrivial grounds at all. Meanwhile, PFA is not generally preserved to
proper grounds, since the usual forcing from a model with a supercompact cardinal
is proper and could start in a model without PFA. We wonder whether there is
a robust fragment of the generic multiverse in which PFA or other forcing axioms
might be necessarily invariant.
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